Cooperation under the security dilemma

By
Samin VossoughiRad
&
Solomeya Shiukashvili

The security dilemma, is a term used
in international relations and refers to a situation
in which actions by a state intended to heighten
its security, such as increasing its military
strength or making alliances, can lead other states
to respond with similar measures, producing
increased tensions that create conflict, even when
no side really desires it

The security dilemma
“A structural notion in which the self-help attempts
of states to look after their security needs tend,
regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity
for others as each interprets its own measures as
defensive and measures of others as potentially
threatening”

The essential and intractable problem that results from
this state of affairs is known as the security dilemma:
 Assume that a particular state seeks only to survive by
pursuing a status quo policy (which necessitates the
maintenance of power)
 This state’s possession of power – no matter how much the
state tries to assure others that it is for defensive purposes
only – must necessarily result in fear/suspicion on the parts
of others
Main reason: The same tools that are used for status quo
and prestige policies are used for imperialist policies
 Absent any enforceable guarantee against the use of force
for expansion – and anarchy precludes the enforcement of
any guarantee – the realist worldview stipulates that the
global community is fraught with arms races and the
constant threat of both imperial and preventative war
Thus, war is likely to occur even when
political “reasons” for war – like revenge,
but even territorial disputes, etc. – are
absent!

Although actors may know that they seek a
common goal, they may not able to reach it
Even when there is a solution that is everyone’s
first choice, the international case is characterized
by 3 difficulties not present in the Stag Hunt
 Even if the other state now supports the status
quo, it may become dissatisfied later
 In order to protect their possessions states seek
to control resources or land outside their own
territory
 States tries to increase its security decrease the
security of others

There is no solution that is in the best interest of
all the participants

The stag hunt is a game that describes a conflict between safety and social
cooperation
The stag hunt differs from the Prisoner's Dilemma in that there are
two Nash equilibria: when both players cooperate and both players
defect. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, in contrast, despite the fact that both
players cooperating is Pareto efficient, the only Nash equilibrium is
when both players choose to defect
CC CD
DDDCDefect
Cooperate
DefectCooperate

There is no solution that is in the best interest of
all the participants.
CC CD
DDDCDefect
Cooperate
DefectCooperate

Decision makers act in terms of the vulnerability
they feel, which can differ from the actual
situation.
Two dimension are involved in the subjective
security requirements:
 people can differ about how much security
they desire
 perception of the threat

Defecting not only avoids the danger that a state
will be exploited, but brings positive advantages
by exploiting the other
To encourage the other state to cooperate, a state
may try to manipulate them. It can lower the
other’s incentives to defect by decreasing what it
could gain by exploiting the state

An increase in one state’s security decreases the
security of others
 Defensive weapons and policies can be
distinguished from offensive ones
 Defense or the offence has the advantage

 Definition of advantage over each other
 Arms races
 Is it better to attack or defend
 How strongly the security Dilemma operates

The intensity of the security dilemma
 "very intense".
 "intense”
 "not intense“
 "doubly safe" Offence has the
advantage
Defense has the
advantage
Offensive
posture is not
distinguishable
from defensive
one
Offensive
posture is
distinguishable
from defensive
one
Double
dangerous
Double stable
Security
dilemma, but the
requirements
may be
compatible
No security dilemma,
but aggression possible.
Status-quo states have
other choices. Warning
given.

Evidence of the security dilemma can be found in the
earliest examples of IR, as illustrated by Woodruff’s
introduction to Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian
Wars
 Greece, 3rd Century BC: Athens and Sparta dominate
 Two very different city-states
 Athens: Sea-faring, commerce-based, democratic, home of
the “new thinking”
 Sparta: Land-based, self-sufficient, oligarchic, military ethos
 Despite all these differences, there seem to be very few political
reasons to go to war
 Thucydides’ only answer: the Peloponnesian Wars were caused
by Athens’ rise to power, and the fear that that power caused
for Sparta – no more, no less

Main factors which determine whether
the offense or defense has the
advantage
The technical capabilities of a state and
its geographical position are two
essential factors in deciding whether
offensive or defensive action is
advantageous.

"Preventative war“
"Preemptive war“
The deterrence model: by Paul K. Huth
 Preventing armed attack against a country's
own territory ("direct deterrence")
 Preventing armed attack against the territory of
another country ("extended deterrence")
 Using deterrence against a short-term threat of
attack ("immediate deterrence").
the balance of power

Cooperation under the security dilemma

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