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CAPSTONE PROJECT PRESENTATION
Analysis and Security
Assessment of Online
Event Management
Systems Presented By:
IAP491_01
Supervisor
Luong Hoang
Huong Page 1 of 78
OUR TEAM
PHAM TRONG TINH
TRINH PHUONG
HUY
MEMBER
MEMBER
VO HOANG PHUC
UNG NHAT TIEN
NGUYEN PHUOC THINH
LEADER
MEMBER
MEMBER
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TABLE OF CONTENT
1. PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT
PLAN
3. RISK ASSESSMENT
4. RISK MANAGEMENT
PLAN
5. Demo
Page 3 of 78
6. Q&A
1. PROJECT
INTRODUCTION
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
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OVERVIEW
EVENT MANAGEMENT APPS LIKE THE FPT EVENT MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM HANDLE SENSITIVE DATA AND IOT CONTROLS, MAKING
SECURITY VITAL. WITH RISKS FROM BOTH WEB AND MOBILE
PLATFORMS, THIS PROJECT APPLIES TAILORED PENETRATION TESTS
AND CHECKLISTS TO FIND AND FIX VULNERABILITIES BEFORE
EXPLOITATION.
1. PROJECT INTRODUCTION
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1. PROJECT INTRODUCTION
Introduction Information System
Event Management System (EMS)
THE EVENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (EMS) MANAGES EVENTS ACROSS
FPT UNIVERSITY WITH FOUR ROLES: STUDENT, ORGANIZER, MANAGER,
AND ADMINISTRATOR. ITS MOBILE APP SUPPORTS EVENT
MANAGEMENT, REGISTRATION, AND SMARTTV INTEGRATION FOR
PRESENTATIONS.
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Use Cases of
Event
Managemen
t System(1)
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Use Cases of
Event
Management
System(2)
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Use Cases of
Event
Management
System(3)
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1. PROJECT INTRODUCTION
CONFIDENTIALITY
Protects sensitive data
like attendee names,
event details, and
feedback; ensures only
authorized access.
INTEGRITY
Maintains accuracy and
consistency of event data,
ensuring reliable reports
and decision-making.
AVAILABILITY
Ensures EMS is operational
with minimal downtime,
enabling smooth
schedules, updates, and
live interactions.
C-I-A IN EMS
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1. PROJECT INTRODUCTION
Deployment Architecture
Deployment Diagram Page 11 of 78
WEB APPLICATION MOBILE APPLICATION
METHODOLOGY
MULTI-ROLE ATTACK
SIMULATION
Pentesting using OWASP-
based methods for
common vulnerabilities
(Injection, XSS, IDOR, SSRF,
Security Misconfiguration).
Source code review, insecure
data/API checks, and OWASP
Mobile Top 10 testing.
Black-box & Gray-box
testing with simulated
accounts.
Testing Anonymous and
Authenticated roles (Student,
Organizer, Manager, Admin,
Super roles) for access control,
privilege escalation, logic
flaws, and insecure
communication.
PROJECT SCOPE
1. PROJECT INTRODUCTION
The thesis evaluates and enhances the security of FPT University’s Event Management System
(EMS) on Web and Mobile platforms through multi-layered security assessments.
OUTCOME
Tailored pentest
framework, detailed
vulnerability report, and
prioritized remediation
strategies.
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2. Project Management
Plan
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
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OVERVIEW
Project management is the key to successfully implementing FPT Event
Management Application penetration testing.
2. PROJECT MANAGEMENT PLAN
Using structured project management principles enables systematic
planning, efficient resource use, risk mitigation, and quality assurance
in penetration testing for FPT’s web and Android event management
application
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Project Management Framework
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Scope & Estimation
WORK
BREAKDOWN
STRUCTURE
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ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
Team Roles Representation
Diagram
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PROJECT RISK MANAGEMENT
RISK
MANAGEMENT
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TOOLING
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PROJECT TIMELINE
MILESTONE PLAN CHART
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PROJECT TIMELINE
GANTT CHART
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PROJECT TIMELINE
CRITICAL PATH
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QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESS
WEB / MOBILE
APPLICATION
TESTING AND
REPORT PROCESS
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3. RISK ASSESSMENT (1)
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
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THE NEED OF ASSESSMENT IS THE REQUIREMENT OF A KEY PROCESS THAT
ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO UNDERTAKE TO IDENTIFY AND MITIGATE POTENTIAL
RISKS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE DEVELOPMENT PERIOD.
3. RISK ASSESSMENT
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ASSETS IDENTIFICATION
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Attribute Details
Asset Type Credentials
Probability Factors
Weak or reused passwords- Lack of multi-
factor authentication- Poor session
management or insecure credential
storage/transmission- Poor role-based access
control, enabling privilege escalation
Probability Medium
Impact Factors
Unauthorized access to sensitive event and
user data- Full system control if Administrator
account compromised- Spoofing, privacy
violations, and data integrity issues for other
roles- Reputational damage, privacy breaches,
regulatory issues, event disruption
Impact High
Attribute Details
Asset Type Penetration Testing Resources
Probability Factors
Insecure storage (unencrypted files, exposed GitHub
repos)
Sharing over insecure channels
Use of shared testing environments or cloud storage
Probability Medium
Impact Factors
- Exposure of vulnerabilities before fixes
- Use of stolen payloads to attack live systems
- Loss of confidentiality of sensitive test results
- Violation of responsible disclosure policies
- Reputational, legal, and contractual risks
Impact Critical
${pageNumberOfTotal}
INFORMATION ASSET CLASSIFICATION
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Attribute Details
Asset Type Application Source Code
Probability Factors
- Public or misconfigured version control
systems
- Source files left on exposed servers or
shared machines
- Leaks via unsecured cloud sharing or
email
- Improper access controls on
repositories
- Lack of obfuscation in mobile apps
Probability Low
Impact Factors
- Discovery of vulnerabilities before fixes
- Theft of proprietary logic and
algorithms
- Exposure of hardcoded secrets
- Facilitation of reverse-engineering
- Intellectual property theft
- Legal liabilities
- Reputational damage and customer
trust loss
Impact High
Attribute Details
Asset Type Display Devices
Probability Factors
- Outdated firmware
- Lack of network segmentation
- Unchanged default credentials
- Unpatched vulnerabilities
- Open remote ports
Probability Low
Impact Factors
- Foothold into internal networks
- Unauthorized content injection
- Covert surveillance via embedded hardware
- Persistent backdoors resistant to reboot
cleanup
Impact Medium
LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE
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THREAT IDENTIFICATION
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No Threats
1 Phishing Attacks
2 Malware / Ransomware
3 Insider Threats
4 Denial-of-Service (DoS)
5 Natural Disasters
6 Third-Party Component Exploits
7 Zero-Day Exploits
VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION
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No Vulnerabilities
1 Cross-Site Scripting[12] (WSTG-INPV-02)
2 Insecure Direct Object References[13] (WSTG-INPV-02)
3 Webpage Content for Information Leakage[14] (WSTG-INFO-05)
4 Cross-site Request Forgery[15] (WSTG-SESS-05)
5 Business Logic[16] (WSTG-BUSL-01)
6 Stack trace[17] (WSTG-ERRH-02)
7 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types[18] (WSTG-BUSL-08)
IMPACT ASSESSMENT
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No Threats / Vulnerabilities Impact
1 Malware and Ransomware Significant Severity
2 Denial of Service (DDoS) Attacks Significant Severity
3 Insider Threats Catastrophic
Severity
4 Phishing Attacks Major Severity
5 Natural Disasters Catastrophic
Severity
6 Zero-day exploit Catastrophic
Severity
7 Third-Party Component Exploits Major Severity
No Threats / Vulnerabilities Impact
8
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) (WSTG-
INPV-02) Significant Severity
9
Insecure Direct Object References
(IDOR) (WSTG-INPV-02) Major Severity
10
Webpage Content for Information
Leakage (WSTG-INFO-05) Minor Severity
11 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
(WSTG-SESS-05) Major Severity
12 Business Logic Flaws (WSTG-BUSL-
01)
Major Severity
13 Stack Trace Disclosure (WSTG-
ERRH-02) Minor Severity
14 Upload of Unexpected File Types
(WSTG-BUSL-08)
Major Severity
LIKELIHOOD ASSESSMENT
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No Threat /
Vulnerability
Likelihood Level
1 Malware and
Ransomware
Likely
2
Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS)
Possible
3 Insider Threats Unlikely
4 Phishing Attacks Almost Certain
5 Natural Disasters Rare
6 Zero-day exploits Rare
7 Third-Party Component Exploits Likely
8 Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Likely
9
Insecure Direct Object References
(IDOR) Likely
10 Information Leakage (WSTG-INFO-
05)
Possible
11 Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Possible
12 Business Logic Flaws Possible
13 Stack Trace Disclosure Possible
14 Unexpected File Upload (WSTG-
BUSL-08)
Likely
RISK LEVEL MATRIX
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Likelihood
Severity Catastrophic-5 Major-4 Significant-3 Minor-2 Insignificant-1
Almost Certain-5 Very High(25) Very High(20) Very High(15) High(10) Medium(5)
Likely-4 Very High(20) Very High(16) High(12) Medium(8) Low(4)
Possible-3 Very High(15) High(12) Medium(9) Medium(6) Low(3)
Unlikely-2 High(10) Medium(8) Medium(6) Low(4) Very Low(2)
Rare-1 Medium(5) Low(4) Low(3) Very Low(2) Very Low(1)
4. RISK ASSESSMENT (2)
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
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Information
Gathering
Asset Identification &
Classification
Risk Identification
Risk
Analysis
Control Identification & Assessment
Risk Controlling &
Monitoring
Final Risk Rating
RISK ASSESSMENT FLOW
Risk
Assessment
Flow
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INFORMATION GATHERING
Archive Mining & Operator Interview (OSINT in Internal
Context)
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INFORMATION GATHERING
Active Network & Service
Enumeration
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INFORMATION GATHERING
Web & Application
Fingerprinting
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STANDARDS AND METHODS USED
Threat Modeling & Analysis
STRIDE – 6 categories of security threats
PASTA – 7-step attack simulation & threat
analysis
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Applied Standards
ISO/IEC 27001 – Information security management
framework
NIST SP 800-30 – Structured risk assessment methodology
OWASP Testing Guide & Top 10 – Web application security
checklist
OWASP MASVS – Mobile application security framework
Vulnerability Scoring
CVSS v3.1 – Base, Temporal, Environmental
scores
ASSET IDENTIFICATION
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ASSET IDENTIFICATION
Technical Infrastructure – 4-Tier
Architecture
Database Layer
SQL Server: structured data (users, events,
logs)
Firebase: real-time push notifications &
updates
Presentation Layer (Client Layer)
Web interface (Chrome, Safari) + Mobile app
Google Sign-In, event view, registration, QR check-in, e-
tickets
Web Server Layer
Windows Server + IIS 10.0
Enforces SSL, access control
Hosts Website Module (browser interface)
Hosts API Module (mobile app requests, real-time
ops)
Web Application Layer
ASP.NET business logic
User roles, event rules, data
updates
Integration with FAP API
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ASSET CLASSIFICATION
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RISK IDENTIFICATION
Classification of threat
object List of threat events
Relationship between threat object vs
asset
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RISK IDENTIFICATION
Relationship between threat object vs threat
event
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Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in CreateEvent via DescriptionHtml
Parameter
Business Logic Data Validation in Event
Rejection
RISK IDENTIFICATION
Vulnerable
identification
Insecure direct object references - Student/UpdateFeedback and
Student/DeleteFeedback
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No Vulnerability Name
1 Cross-Site Scripting
2 Cross-site Request Forgery
3 Insecure Direct Object References
4 Cross-site Request Forgery
5 Insecure Direct Object References
6 Cross-site Request Forgery
7 Insecure Direct Object References
8 Cross-site Request Forgery
9 Cross-site Request Forgery
10 Insecure Direct Object References
11 Business Logic Data Validation
12 Testing for Exposed Session Variables
13 Stack Trace Disclosure
14 Test Upload of Unexpected File Types
15 Shortname Enumeration in IIS
RISK RATING
Threat Actor Capability
Assessment
Vulnerability Characteristics
Assessment
Likelihood
Assessment
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RISK RATING
Impact Assessment Technical Impact
Assessment
Business Impact
Assessment
Page 47 of 78
RISK RATING
Risk Score Interpretation
Risk Score Severity
Matrix
Likelihood scoring
table
Impact scoring
table
Page 48 of 78
RISK RATING
Risk Rating
Details
Testing for Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in CreateEvent via DescriptionHtml
Parameter
Risk Likelihood Assessment Table of
vulnerability
Likelihood Score = (4 + 7 + 8 + 7 + 8 + 9 + 7 + 3) / 8 = 53 / 8 = 6.625 (High
Likelihood)
Page 49 of 78
Factor Score Rationale
Threat Agent Factors
Skill Level 4 Requires knowledge of XSS payload crafting and targeting rendered fields.
Motive 7 High incentive to escalate privileges or steal session tokens.
Opportunity 8 Any Organizer can inject a payload; stored XSS increases the chance of hitting
privileged users.
Size 7 Many potential attackers if the Organizer role is common across users.
Vulnerability Factors
Ease of Discovery 8 Easily identifiable through testing WYSIWYG/HTML input fields.
Ease of Exploit 9 Once payload is stored, it auto-executes on page load for others.
Awareness 7 XSS is well-known and documented in OWASP Top 10.
Intrusion Detection 3 XSS may silently exfiltrate data or perform actions without detection.
RISK RATING
Risk Rating
Details
Testing for Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in CreateEvent via DescriptionHtml
Parameter
Risk Impact Assessment Table of
vulnerability
Impact Score = (6 + 8 + 4 + 7 + 5 + 6 + 5 + 6) / 8 = 47 / 8 = 5.875 →
(Medium Impact)
Page 50 of 78
Factor Score Rationale
Technical Impact
Loss of Confidentiality 6 Attacker can steal session cookies, CSRF tokens, and sensitive user data.
Loss of Integrity 8
Attacker can forge requests, modify victim data, or create unauthorized
actions.
Loss of Availability 4 Indirect DoS possible if malicious content disrupts rendering or logic.
Loss of Accountability 7 Attacker can act on behalf of other users without traceability.
Business Impact
Financial Damage 5 Potential indirect damage if used for fraud or service abuse.
Reputation Damage 6 Trust in the system is reduced if users see malicious or hijacked pages.
Non-Compliance 5 Violates data protection and input handling policies.
Privacy Violation 6 Sensitive information can be exfiltrated via JavaScript (e.g., names, email).
RISK RATING
Risk Rating
Details
Testing for Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in CreateEvent via DescriptionHtml
Parameter
Risk Score = Likelihood × Impact = 6.625 × 5.875
= 38.92
OWASP Severity table of
vulnerability
Page 51 of 78
Likelihood Impact Severity
High (6.625) Medium (5.875) High
SUMMARY FINDINGS
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No Vulnerability Name OTG Affected Host/Path Risk
Risk
Score
1 Cross-Site Scripting WSTG-INPV-02
https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Organizer/CreateEvent (POST:
DescriptionHtml) High 38.92
2 Cross-site Request Forgery WSTG-SESS-05 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Admin/DeleteBuilding/{building id} High 33
3 Insecure Direct Object References WSTG-ATHZ-04
https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Student/UpdateFeedback (POST:
UserId,EventId,Value,CreatedDate,FeedbackContent)
https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Student/DeleteFeedback (POST:
UserId,EventId)
High 31.25
4 Cross-site Request Forgery WSTG-SESS-05 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Manager/DeleteGroup/{group id} Medium 28.2
5 Insecure Direct Object References WSTG-ATHZ-04 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Home/GetFeedback (POST: eventId) Medium 27.31
6 Cross-site Request Forgery WSTG-SESS-05 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Manager/DeleteCategory/{category id} Medium 26.8
7 Insecure Direct Object References WSTG-ATHZ-04 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Organizer/CreateEvent (POST: Campus) Medium 24.06
8 Cross-site Request Forgery WSTG-SESS-05 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Manager/AcceptEvent/{event id} Medium 24.06
9 Cross-site Request Forgery WSTG-SESS-05
https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Manager/RejectReportedEvent
(POST:eventId)
Medium 20.625
10 Insecure Direct Object References WSTG-ATHZ-04 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/api/smartTv/insertSmartTv Medium 20.19
11 Business Logic Data Validation WSTG-BUSL-01 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Manager/RejectReportedEvent
(POST:eventId)
Medium 19.66
12 Testing for Exposed Session Variables WSTG-SESS-04
https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/api/auth/smartTv/getTvAccessToken?
idGoogleToken=
Low 14.375
13 Stack Trace Disclosure WSTG-ERRH-02 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/ Low 6.3
14 Test Upload of Unexpected File
Types
WSTG-BUSL-08 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/Home/ManageProfile Low 6.09
15 Shortname Enumeration in IIS WSTG-INFO-07 https://googleauthensite03.fpt.edu.vn:93/ Low 4.64
5. RISK MANAGEMENT
PLAN
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
Page 53 of 78
Risk Treatment
Measure
Prioritization
Phase
2
Implementation and
Monitoring
1. Apply Risk
Treatments
2. Monitoring and
Review
3. Long-term security
Phase 3
Communication and
Consultation
1. Stakeholder
Communication
2. Feedback and
Documentation
Phase 4
Risk
assessment
1. Risk
identification
2. Risk Analysis
3. Risk
Evaluation
Phase
1
RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND PHASE
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RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND PHASE
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Objectives
of Risk
Managemen
t Plan (RMP)
Identify and
Prioritize Security
Risks
Identify and
Prioritize Security
Risks
Identify and
Prioritize Security
Risks
Identify and
Prioritize Security
Risks
Identify and
Prioritize Security
Risks
Page 56 of 78
Threat Modeling
Continuous
Monitoring
Risk Appetite &
Tolerance
Risk Register & Heat
Map
Risk
Managemen
t Approach
Qualitative &
Quantitative
Analysis
Cost–Benefit
Analysis (CBA) &
BCR Ratio
Page 57 of 78
𝑹𝒊𝒔𝒌 = 𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅 𝒙
𝑰𝒎𝒑𝒂𝒄𝒕
Risk Likelihoo
d
Impac
t
QUALITATIVE & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
Page 58 of 78
COST–BENEFIT ANALYSIS (CBA) & BCR RATIO
𝑩𝑪𝑹 = ÷
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒆𝒇𝒊𝒕
𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕
Page 59 of 78
RISK REGISTER & HEAT MAP
Page 60 of 78
Define the Objectives
Define the Technical Scope
Decompose the Application
Analyze the Threats
Vulnerability Analysis
Attack Analysis (Simulation)
Risk and Impact Analysis
STRID
E
Threat Modeling
PASTA
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RISK APPETITE & TOLERANCE
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Risk Value (VND) Response Action Example
< 30,000,000 VND Accept and monitor UI bug with no impact on core
system logic
30,000,000 – 50,000,000 VND Mitigate within 30 days SQL injection o
> 50,000,000 VND Immediate action; escalate to
management
Student data leakage impacting
the university’s reputation
Key Risk
Indicators(KRIs)
Automated scanning tools
Regular review
cycles
CONTINUOUS MONITORING
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Risk
Management
Implementatio
n Process
Framing
Risk
Framing
Risk
Monitorin
g Risk
Assessin
gRisk
Respondin
g to Risk
Page 64 of 78
Risk
Handling
Planning
Overview of Risk Handling Planning
Risk Treatment Strategies
Benefits of Structured Risk
Handling
RISK HANDLING PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
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RISK HANDLING IMPLEMENTATION
Cross-site Request
Forgery(CSRF)
Insecure Direct
Object
Reference(IDO
R)
Cross-site
Scripting(XS
S)
Page 66 of 78
Include @Html.AntiForgeryToken() within the
form
Adding [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] to
controller
Cross-site Request
Forgery(CSRF)
RISK HANDLING IMPLEMENTATION
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Cross-Site Scripting
(XSS)
• HTML Sanitization
• Contextual Output
Encoding
• Content Security Policy
(CSP)
• Restrict Input to
Markdown or Whitelisted
HTML
• Ownership Verification
• Remove UserId from
Client Input
• Centralized
Authorization Checks
RISK HANDLING IMPLEMENTATION
Insecure Direct Object
Reference(IDOR)
Page 68 of 78
RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND PHASE
Page 69 of 78
Measure Vulnerability Scope BCR
Output Encoding (Html.Encode) Stored XSS – DescriptionHtml 5
Event Status Validation GetFeedback – unauthorized
feedback
4.5
Remove UserId from Client Input Feedback endpoints (IDOR) 4
Restrict Client-Side Campus Input Organizer/CreateEvent –
unauthorized campus access 4
Role-Based Access Validation
(RBAC)
Manipulating parameters on /api/
request (IDOR) 4
IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY
Risk Treatment
Measure
Prioritization
Phase
2
Implementation and
Monitoring
1. Apply Risk
Treatments
2. Monitoring and
Review
3. Long-term security
Phase 3
Communication and
Consultation
1. Stakeholder
Communication
2. Feedback and
Documentation
Phase 4
Risk
assessment
1. Risk
identification
2. Risk Analysis
3. Risk
Evaluation
Phase
1
Page 70 of 78
REPEAT RISK ASSESSMENT PROCESS
Repeat Risk Assessment Process
Check and Add
for a New Critical
Asset Appeared
Check for a
Change of
IT
Environmen
t
New Risk
Assessmen
t
Page 71 of 78
RISK ANALYSIS
Qualitative
Analysis
Page 72 of 78
No. Vulnerabilities Methods Consequences Impact Level
1 Testing for Exposed
Session Variables
Inspecting client-side code,
analyzing responses, and reviewing
session handling via Burp Suite or
browser developer tools
Exposure of session tokens or
sensitive user-specific data
may lead to session hijacking
or privilege escalation.
Low
2 Stack Trace Disclosure
Triggering unexpected inputs or
error conditions to observe server
responses
Reveals internal application
structure, file paths, or code
logic that can aid attackers in
crafting targeted attacks.
Low
3 Shortname
Enumeration in IIS
Using specially crafted requests
(e.g., ~1) to detect 8.3 filename
format support in IIS
May allow attackers to infer
hidden files or directories,
leading to information
disclosure or targeted file
access.
Low
RISK ANALYSIS
Quantitative
Analysis
Page 73 of 78
No. Vulnerability Name Consequences Impact Level
1 Cross-Site Scripting
This may allow attackers to forge requests to CSRF
using XSS payloads, deface the UI, or perform
phishing within the application context.
High
2 Cross-site Request
Forgery
Enables unauthorized actions on behalf of
authenticated users without their consent, leading to
potential data manipulation or privilege escalation.
High
3 Insecure Direct Object
References
Attackers can access or manipulate unauthorized
data by modifying object references in requests.
High
4 Cross-site Request
Forgery
Enables unauthorized actions on behalf of
authenticated users without their consent, leading to
potential data manipulation or privilege escalation.
Medium
5 Insecure Direct Object
References
Attackers can access or manipulate unauthorized
data by modifying object references in requests. Medium
6
Cross-site Request
Forgery
Enables unauthorized actions on behalf of
authenticated users without their consent, leading to
potential data manipulation or privilege escalation.
Medium
RISK ANALYSIS
Quantitative
Analysis
Page 74 of 78
No. Vulnerability Name Consequences Impact Level
7
Insecure Direct Object
References
Attackers can access or manipulate unauthorized data by
modifying object references in requests.
Medium
8 Cross-site Request
Forgery
Enables unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated users
without their consent, leading to potential data manipulation or
privilege escalation.
Medium
9
Cross-site Request
Forgery
Enables unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated users
without their consent, leading to potential data manipulation or
privilege escalation.
Medium
10 Insecure Direct Object
References
Attackers can access or manipulate unauthorized data by
modifying object references in requests.
Medium
11 Business Logic Data
Validation
Bypassing logic checks may lead to inconsistent states, financial
fraud, or bypass of authorization constraints. Medium
12
Test Upload of
Unexpected File Types
May allow attackers to upload unexpected file types and bypass
file filters. Low
RISK ANALYSIS
Provable Risk
Mitigation
Page 75 of 78
No. Vulnerabilities Recommendation
1 Cross-Site Scripting
HTML Sanitization
Contextual Output Encoding
Content Security Policy (CSP)
Restrict Input to Markdown or Whitelisted HTML
2 Cross-site Request Forgery
(RejectReportedEvent Functionality)
Implement Anti-Forgery Token
SameSite Cookie Policy
3
Insecure Direct Object References
(UpdateFeedback and DeleteFeedback)
Ownership Verification
Centralized Authorization Checks
Remove UserId from Client Input
4 Cross-site Request Forgery (DeleteGroup
Functionality)
Implement Anti-Forgery Token
SameSite Cookie Policy
5
Insecure Direct Object References
(GetFeedback Functionality)
Event Status Validation
Role-Based Feedback Access Control
Centralized Event Access Policy
Vulnerability
Demo
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
Page 76 of 78
Q & A
Section
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
Page 77 of 78
THANKS FOR YOUR
ATTENTION
IAP491_01 August 30, 2025
Page 78 of 78