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ec: make ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder() scalar padding constant time
Fixes CVE-2026-54872 Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-8 Reviewed-by: Alicja Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Merge-date: Tue Sep 29 11:26:03 2026
1 parent 7276e9b commit 1a5bee8

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‎crypto/bn/bn_intern.c‎

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "bn_local.h"
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#include "internal/constant_time.h"
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/*
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* Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'.
@@ -152,6 +153,43 @@ void bn_set_all_zero(BIGNUM *a)
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a->d[i] = 0;
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}
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/*
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* Zero-extend |a| so that it occupies exactly |words| words, flag it
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* BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP and leave its numeric value unchanged.
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*
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* This is a companion to bn_correct_top(): where the latter minimises the top
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* of a BIGNUM, this one pins the top to a caller-chosen, value-independent
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* width. Constant-time code uses it to make the cost of subsequent word-wise
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* operations (e.g. BN_uadd()/BN_add()) independent of the magnitude of a
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* secret value. |words| must be greater than or equal to the current top.
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*
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* The routine is itself constant time with respect to the current a->top: it
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* always sweeps a fixed |words| iterations and selects value-or-zero per word
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* with an arithmetic mask, rather than looping over the (possibly secret)
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* a->top..words range. Masking the high words with zero also launders any
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* uninitialised padding, so it is safe for the memory sanitiser.
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*/
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int bn_set_top_fixed(BIGNUM *a, int words)
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{
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size_t i, n = (size_t)words;
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BN_ULONG mask;
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if (words < a->top)
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return 0;
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if (bn_wexpand(a, words) == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
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/* mask = all ones iff i < a->top, else all zeros */
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mask = value_barrier_bn((BN_ULONG)0 - ((i - a->top) >> (8 * sizeof(i) - 1)));
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a->d[i] &= mask;
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}
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a->top = words;
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a->flags |= BN_FLG_FIXED_TOP;
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return 1;
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}
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int bn_copy_words(BN_ULONG *out, const BIGNUM *in, int size)
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{
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if (in->top > size)

‎crypto/ec/ec_mult.c‎

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -213,6 +213,18 @@ int ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* Constant-timeness of this copy depends on the caller: BN_copy() moves
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* scalar->top words unless |scalar| is flagged BN_FLG_CONSTTIME (in which
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* case scalar->dmax words are moved). Secret scalars are therefore
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* expected to arrive either BN_FLG_CONSTTIME or fixed-top, so that their
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* top is a public, value-independent width and the copy length does not
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* leak their magnitude. ECDSA satisfies this via
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* ossl_bn_priv_rand_range_fixed_top(); the generic SM2 signing path does
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* not yet (see the sm2_sig_gen() hardening tracked separately). The
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* fixed-top pinning below makes the subsequent arithmetic constant time
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* regardless, but cannot retroactively fix the copy length here.
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*/
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if (!BN_copy(k, scalar)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
@@ -231,10 +243,36 @@ int ossl_ec_scalar_mul_ladder(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
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}
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}
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/*
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* |k| may still carry a top that depends on the value of the secret
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* scalar: callers pass either a fixed-top BIGNUM (e.g. the ECDSA nonce)
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* or a minimal-top one (e.g. SM2), and BN_copy() above preserves that
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* top. Pin |k| to a fixed number of words (matching the group
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* cardinality) so that the additions below run in constant time,
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* independently of the bit length of the scalar. Otherwise the work
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* done by BN_add()/BN_uadd() depends on the operand tops and leaks the
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* magnitude of the secret scalar.
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*/
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if (!bn_set_top_fixed(k, group_top)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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if (!BN_add(lambda, k, cardinality)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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/*
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* |lambda| = scalar + cardinality may or may not have produced a carry
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* into an extra word depending on the secret scalar. Pin its top to one
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* word above the group top so that the second addition, which consumes
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* |lambda|, is likewise constant time and so that the BN_is_bit_set()
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* below always inspects a defined word.
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*/
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if (!bn_set_top_fixed(lambda, group_top + 1)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
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goto err;
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}
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BN_set_flags(lambda, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
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if (!BN_add(k, lambda, cardinality)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EC, ERR_R_BN_LIB);

‎include/crypto/bn.h‎

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ BIGNUM *bn_wexpand(BIGNUM *a, int words);
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BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
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2020
void bn_correct_top(BIGNUM *a);
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int bn_set_top_fixed(BIGNUM *a, int words);
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/*
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* Determine the modified width-(w+1) Non-Adjacent Form (wNAF) of 'scalar'.

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