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
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# The COP30 Climate Change Conference

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Part I: Framework of COP negotiations  
and main expected issues



Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health  
Directorate-General for Economy, Transformation and Industry  
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# The COP30 Climate Change Conference

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## Part I: Framework of COP negotiations and main expected issues

### **Abstract**

This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.

This document was prepared by the Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health at the request of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI).

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI).

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<b>ACE</b>	Action for Climate Empowerment
<b>AI</b>	Artificial Intelligence
<b>BAR</b>	Baku Adaptation Roadmap
<b>BTR</b>	Biennial Transparency Report
<b>CBIT</b>	Capacity-building Initiative for Transparency
<b>CDM</b>	Clean Development Mechanism
<b>CER</b>	Certified Emission Reduction
<b>CMA</b>	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement
<b>CMP</b>	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol
<b>COP</b>	Conference of the Parties
<b>CORSIA</b>	Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation
<b>COVID</b>	Coronavirus Disease
<b>CTCN</b>	Climate Technology Centre and Network
<b>DPI</b>	Digital Public Infrastructure
<b>EIG</b>	Environmental Integrity Group
<b>ETF</b>	Enhanced Transparency Framework
<b>FRLD</b>	Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage
<b>FWG</b>	Facilitative Working Group
<b>GAP</b>	Gender Action Plan

<b>GGA</b>	Global Goal on Adaptation
<b>GHG</b>	Greenhouse gas
<b>GSP</b>	Global Support Programme
<b>GST</b>	Global Stocktake
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice
<b>IPCC</b>	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
<b>ITMO</b>	Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcome
<b>LCIPP</b>	Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform
<b>LDC</b>	Least Developed Country
<b>LULUCF</b>	Land use, land-use change and forestry
<b>LT-LEDS</b>	Long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategy
<b>MDB</b>	Multilateral Development Bank
<b>NAP</b>	National Adaptation Plan
<b>NCQG</b>	New Collective Quantified Goal
<b>NDC</b>	Nationally Determined Contribution
<b>NMA</b>	Non-Market Approach
<b>OMGE</b>	Overall Mitigation in Global Emissions
<b>PACM</b>	Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism
<b>PCCB</b>	Paris Committee on Capacity-building
<b>RCC</b>	Regional Collaboration Centre
<b>SBI</b>	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
<b>SBSTA</b>	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

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<b>SCF</b>	Standing Committee on Finance
<b>SDG</b>	Sustainable Development Goal
<b>SIDS</b>	Small Island Developing State
<b>SOP</b>	Share Of Proceeds
<b>TEC</b>	Technology Executive Committee
<b>TFFF</b>	Tropical Forests Forever Fund
<b>TIP</b>	Technology Implementation Programme
<b>UAE</b>	United Arab Emirates
<b>UNDRR</b>	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
<b>UNEP</b>	United Nations Environment Programme
<b>UNFCCC</b>	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
<b>UNOPS</b>	United Nations Office for Project Services
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>WIM</b>	Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts
<b>WMO</b>	World Meteorological Organization

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Given the current political and economic challenges and uncertainties, issues other than climate change have taken centre stage on the international political agenda. Nevertheless, with rising global temperatures and frequent extreme weather events, climate change remains a key challenge to address. Global greenhouse gas emissions are still increasing, while fast and deep emission reductions are needed to keep the goals of the Paris Agreement within reach. This is particularly true as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO 2025) found that 2024 was likely the first year on record that had a global mean temperature of more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (°C) above pre-industrial levels.

Against this backdrop, the 30<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will take place in Belém, Brazil, from 10 to 21 November 2025. Delegates will meet to discuss and advance the mitigation of climate change, the adaptation to climate change impacts, and the support to developing countries.

This study introduces the issues at stake at COP30. It has been drafted as a background document for the delegation of the European Parliament but may also be of interest to readers who wish to gain an overview of the topics addressed in the climate negotiations.

Part I of the study covers the framework of COP negotiations and main expected issues. It is structured as follows:

**Chapter 2** provides an overview of the international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. It introduces the bodies meeting at climate change conferences and summarises the topics discussed there.

**Chapter 3** provides a more detailed explanation of the status of negotiations and the issues to be addressed at COP30. It discusses the main topics covered by the Paris Agreement, as well as additional topics which are negotiated under the UNFCCC.

**Chapter 4** draws conclusions on the issues at stake at COP30 and provides an outlook on issues to be addressed after the conference has ended.

## 2. OVERVIEW OF THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS

### 2.1. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

The development of the **United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)** was initiated by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in 1990 (United Nations 1990). The Convention was adopted in 1992 and opened for signature at the United Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in the same year. Its objective is to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 'at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system' (UNFCCC 1992). The Convention entered into force in 1994.

In 1997, the **Kyoto Protocol** was adopted. Under this treaty, many developed country Parties committed to targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions during the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC 1997) and the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020 (UNFCCC 2012). However, the United States did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol; Canada withdrew from it in 2011; and several developed countries did not commit to emission reductions in the second commitment period.

Delegates from Parties to the UNFCCC convene annually at the **Conference of the Parties (COP)**. The COP also serves as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement (see section 2.2). Table 1 provides an overview of the main bodies that meet at each COP.

Table 1: Main bodies meeting at each COP

Body	Purpose	Year(s) of first session	Upcoming session
Conference of the Parties (COP)	Keep under review and promote the implementation of the Convention.	1995	COP30
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP)	Adopt guidelines for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, review and promote its implementation.	2005	CMP20
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)	Adopt modalities and guidance for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and take stock of its implementation.	2016 - 2018	CMA7
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	Provide information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention. It convenes twice a year.	1995	SBSTA63
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)	Assess and review the effective implementation of the Convention. It convenes twice a year.	1995	SBI63

Source: UNFCCC (1992), UNFCCC (1997), UNFCCC (2015b).

Note: The upcoming session is the one taking place in November 2025.

## 2.2. The Paris Agreement

Against the backdrop of increasing GHG emissions, particularly from emerging economies, the Parties to the UNFCCC began debating the need for a broader international instrument than the Kyoto Protocol in the 2000s. Having failed to reach an agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the Parties initiated negotiations on a new instrument under the UNFCCC applicable to all Parties in 2011 (UNFCCC 2011). These negotiations were concluded at COP21 in 2015, when the Paris Agreement was adopted (UNFCCC 2015b).

The **Paris Agreement** was opened for signature in 2016 and entered into force in November of the same year. Of the 198 Parties to the UNFCCC, all except Iran, Libya and Yemen are also Parties to the Paris Agreement<sup>1</sup>. In January 2025, the United States notified the Secretary-General of the United Nations of its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. This withdrawal is set to take effect in January 2026.

### 2.2.1. Goals of the Paris Agreement

According to Article 2, the Paris Agreement 'aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty'. It is guided by three goals, as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Goals of the Paris Agreement


Goal	Description	Article
Temperature goal	Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognising that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change.	2.1.(a)
Adaptation goal	Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production.	2.1.(b)
Finance flows goal	Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.	2.1.(c)

Source: UNFCCC (2015b).

While these three goals provide an overall direction in the areas of mitigation, adaptation and finance, the Paris Agreement also includes more detailed provisions in these and other climate-related areas. These are contained in the various articles of the Paris Agreement, as depicted in Figure 1.

<sup>1</sup> United Nations (2025), Status of Treaties, available at [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg\\_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=\\_en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-d&chapter=27&clang=_en).

Figure 1: Articles of the Paris Agreement



Source: UNFCCC (2015b), authors' own diagram.

The following provides an overview of the main topics covered by the Paris Agreement. Chapter 3 provides more details on the status of negotiations on each of these topics.

### 2.2.2. Mitigation

In order to mitigate climate change and keep the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement within reach, GHG emissions need to be substantially reduced, and the removals of GHG from the atmosphere by sinks (e.g. forests) need to be increased. According to Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, Parties aim to achieve 'global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible' and 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century' (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.1).

To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, each Party is required to prepare a **Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC)**. Each successive NDC has to represent a progression beyond the Party's current NDC and reflect its highest possible ambition. NDCs are due every five years, including in 2025 (UNFCCC 2015a, paragraph 23-24). For their 2025 NDC submissions, Parties are encouraged – but not required – to use an end date of 2035 (UNFCCC 2021d). To date, most NDCs submitted as of August 2025 have a time frame of 2031 to 2035.

In addition to the requirement of communicating an NDC, Parties should strive to formulate and communicate **long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies (LT-LEDS)** (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.19). The LT-LEDS have a time frame up to mid-century and lay out how Parties plan to achieve a balance between GHG emissions and removals, also known as net-zero emissions or climate neutrality.

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A separate article of the Paris Agreement, Article 5, states that Parties should conserve and enhance **sinks and reservoirs of GHG, including forests**.

### 2.2.3. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6

In the implementation of their NDCs, Parties have the option of cooperating with other Parties, which can allow for higher ambition than pursuing domestic mitigation measures alone. Under the Paris Agreement, the Parties can engage in **cooperative approaches**, where internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) are used towards the achievement of an NDC target (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 6.2).

In addition to allowing cooperative approaches between countries, the Paris Agreement established a **carbon crediting mechanism** under the authority of the CMA. This mechanism has recently been named as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM). The aim of this mechanism is to contribute to GHG emission reductions in host countries, which can then be used by another Party to fulfil its NDC (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 6.4). It can be seen as the successor of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol.

Besides the carbon market approaches introduced under Articles 6.2 and 6.4 of the Paris Agreement, a framework for **non-market approaches** (NMAs) was established under Article 6.8. Examples of non-market approaches are presented on the NMA Platform<sup>2</sup>. As of September 2025, there are two examples on the platform, which focus on cooperation in the area of adaptation.

### 2.2.4. Adaptation

Besides mitigating GHG emissions, all countries need to adapt to the impacts of climate change, which become more evident from year to year. Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes a **global goal on adaptation**, which has three components:

- enhancing adaptive capacity;
- strengthening resilience; and
- reducing vulnerability to climate change.

Further, Article 7 highlights the importance of support and international cooperation for adaptation efforts. Areas in which cooperation should be strengthened and action should be enhanced include information sharing, strengthening institutional arrangements and scientific knowledge, assisting developing countries, and improving the effectiveness and durability of adaptation actions.

The Paris Agreement requires each Party to engage in an **adaptation planning process and to implement adaptation actions**. In addition, each Party should, as appropriate, provide and update periodically an **adaptation communication**, laying out its adaptation priorities, needs, plans and actions.

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<sup>2</sup> UNFCCC (2025p), NMA Platform, available at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/cooperative-implementation/Article-6-8/nma-platform/main/non-market-approaches>.

### 2.2.5. Loss and damage

There is only limited capacity to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change, such as extreme weather events and sea level rise. Such adverse effects are increasingly leading to loss of life, and to loss and damage of infrastructure and property. The topic of **averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage** has been a high priority for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and is addressed in the Paris Agreement under Article 8.

This article lists areas of cooperation, including early warning systems, emergency preparedness, risk assessment and management, risk insurance, and the resilience of communities, livelihoods and ecosystems. Under the Paris Agreement, the '**Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage**' (**WIM**) is subject to the guidance of the CMA. The WIM was established by the COP in 2013, and its task is to promote the implementation of approaches to address loss and damage, inter alia by enhancing knowledge, strengthening coordination and enhancing action and support (UNFCCC 2013). The **Santiago Network** was established in 2019. This constituted body is responsible for catalysing technical assistance to developing countries from various organisations in the area of loss and damage (UNFCCC 2019).

### 2.2.6. Support

While many developing countries have relatively low GHG emissions, they are particularly affected by the adverse effects of climate change and have limited resources for mitigation and adaptation. Hence, the provision of support to developing countries is a key element of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. This support comprises three components, namely:

- finance;
- technology development and transfer; and
- capacity building.

Article 9 of the Paris Agreement reiterates the Convention's provision that **developed country Parties shall provide financial resources** for the mitigation and adaptation actions of developing countries. Although the Parties obliged to provide support are listed individually in an annex to the Convention, the Paris Agreement does not refer to this list, and it encourages other Parties to provide support on a voluntary basis. This reflects the economic development of emerging markets, many of which provide climate change support, despite not being required to do so under the Convention. According to Article 9, Parties should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation in the provision of scaled-up financial resources.

Technology plays a key role in the response to climate change, from wind turbines to flood control and early warning systems. In order to support developing countries in developing and transferring such technology, a **Technology Framework** was established under Article 10 of the Paris Agreement. Its purpose is to guide the work of the Technology Mechanism, which consists of a policy body, the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), and an implementation body, the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) (UNFCCC 2010).

Article 10 of the Paris Agreement stresses the role of technology in implementing mitigation and adaptation actions and the importance of accelerating and enabling innovation.

Article 11 of the Paris Agreement focuses on enhancing the capacities of developing countries to take effective climate action. The COP decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC 2015a) established the **Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB)**. The PCCB is responsible for managing and overseeing cooperation and knowledge-enhancing activities.

### 2.2.7. Education, training and public awareness

In order to enhance climate action, it is important to educate and train people, to raise public awareness, and to facilitate public participation and public access to information. These topics are addressed under Article 12 of the Paris Agreement, which states that Parties shall cooperate in taking measures in these areas.

### 2.2.8. Transparency and reporting by Parties

Article 13 of the Paris Agreement establishes an **Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF)**. Under this framework, Parties report biennially:

- a national inventory report on GHG emissions and removals;
- information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving the NDC;
- information on climate change impacts and adaptation; and
- information on financial, technology transfer and capacity-building support.

This information is to be reported in **Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)**, the first of which were due in December 2024 (UNFCCC 2018a). The reported information is subject to a technical expert review and to a 'Facilitative Multilateral Consideration of Progress,' a question-and-answer format which is conducted in writing, and in person during the SBI sessions.

The reporting on climate change impacts and adaptation is not mandatory. The reporting on support provided and mobilised is mandatory for developed country Parties, while developing country Parties should report information on support needed and received.

Table 3 provides an overview of the key documents submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. All documents are available on the UNFCCC website via the links provided in the table.

Table 3: Key documents submitted by Parties under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC

Documents	Mandate	Topics covered	Link to submitted documents
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)	Article 3, Article 4	Efforts in mitigation (and adaptation and support)	<a href="https://unfccc.int/NDCREG">https://unfccc.int/NDCREG</a>
Long-term low GHG emission development strategies	Article 4	Long-term GHG emission reduction	<a href="https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies">https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies</a>
Initial reports and annual information	Article 6	Information on cooperative approaches	<a href="https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article-6/article-62/carp/reports">https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/article-6/article-62/carp/reports</a>
Adaptation communications	Article 7	Adaptation priorities, needs, plans and actions	<a href="https://unfccc.int/ACR">https://unfccc.int/ACR</a>
Biennial communications on financial support	Article 9	Indicative information including projected levels of financial support	<a href="https://unfccc.int/Art.9.5-biennial-communications">https://unfccc.int/Art.9.5-biennial-communications</a>
Biennial Transparency Reports	Article 13	GHG inventory, mitigation, adaptation, support	<a href="https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports">https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports</a>
National Communications	UNFCCC Article 12	GHG inventory, mitigation, adaptation, support, research, education	<a href="https://unfccc.int/NC8">https://unfccc.int/NC8</a> ; <a href="https://unfccc.int/non-annex-I-NCs">https://unfccc.int/non-annex-I-NCs</a>

Source: UNFCCC (2015b), UNFCCC (2015a), UNFCCC (1992).

Notes: The listed articles are from the Paris Agreement, except the last entry, which is an article of the UNFCCC. The specific mandate for the biennial communication on financial support is, according to Article 9.5, 'indicative quantitative and qualitative information related to paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, as applicable, including, as available, projected levels of public financial resources to be provided to developing country Parties'.

### 2.2.9. Global stocktake

When the Paris Agreement was adopted, it was not clear whether the contributions put forward by countries would be sufficient to reach the goals of the Agreement. Hence a mechanism was introduced to regularly **take stock of global progress and to help increase ambition**: the Global Stocktake (GST), which is set out in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement. The GST takes place every five years. The first GST was concluded by the CMA in 2023 (UNFCCC 2023b), and its outcome is to be taken into account by Parties when they prepare their 2025 NDC submissions.

#### 2.2.10. Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement

Finally, under Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, a committee was established to **facilitate implementation of the agreement and to promote compliance** with its provisions. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, the committee has a more facilitative role and may not take any punitive measures.

#### 2.2.11. Overview of key milestones in the implementation of the Paris Agreement

Ten years after the Paris Agreement was adopted, all of its provisions are being implemented. While progress is slow in some areas, important advances have been made in others. Box 1 lists some of the milestones achieved since the Paris Agreement was adopted.

## BOX 1: MILESTONES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT

**December 2015:** The Paris Agreement was adopted at COP21 (see section 2.2).

**November 2016:** The Paris Agreement entered into force earlier than many had expected, after an important number of Parties, including large economies, ratified the agreement. The first meeting of the Parties, CMA1, took place in the same month at COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco.

**October 2018:** The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published its Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 °C. It highlighted the widespread negative impacts of temperature increases of 1.5 °C and 2 °C above pre-industrial levels. It contributed to discussions focusing on the 1.5 °C goal (rather than the 2 °C goal) of the Paris Agreement in subsequent years.

**December 2018:** A large part of a work programmes to elaborate the detailed rules under the Paris Agreement was completed at COP24 in Katowice, Poland: The CMA adopted rules for the implementation of the Paris Agreement in the areas of mitigation, adaptation, support and transparency, among others.

**2020:** Parties submitted updated or new NDCs. However, due to the COVID pandemic, the COP did not take place that year, and many Parties submitted their NDCs a year later.

**November 2021:** At COP26 in Glasgow, United Kingdom, the CMA adopted rules for voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The CMA called for the phase-down of unabated coal power.

**December 2023:** At COP28 in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates, the CMA established a dedicated fund for addressing loss and damage. The Global Stocktake was concluded, with calls on Parties, inter alia, to contribute to global efforts in the area of mitigation and to pursue adaptation targets (see sections 3.4 and **Error! Reference source not found.**).

**November 2024:** At COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, Parties agreed on a new collective quantified goal for climate finance (see section 3.5.1).

**2025:** Parties submit new NDCs covering the period up to 2035. Many NDCs are expected to be communicated in the run-up to COP30. However, the emission reductions set out in the NDCs for the period up to 2030 continue to fall short of those needed to achieve the temperature goal set out in the Paris Agreement.

Source: UNFCCC (2015a), UNFCCC (2018b), UNFCCC (2021b), UNFCCC (2023b), IPCC (2018).

## 3. TOPICS ADDRESSED IN THE CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS AND MAIN ISSUES AT STAKE AT COP30

This chapter provides details on the main topics under the Paris Agreement and the UNFCCC. It summarises the outcomes of the previous climate change conferences (mainly COP28 and COP29), and addresses the issues at stake at the upcoming COP30.

### 3.1. Mitigation

#### 3.1.1. Communication of new NDCs

The Parties to the Paris Agreement have committed to **communicating their NDCs every five years**. Article 4 of the Paris Agreement establishes that each new NDC will be more ambitious than its predecessor and include the 'highest possible ambition' (Article 4.3). One way to advance ambition is, for example, to set an economy-wide target in an NDC if sectors of the economy were previously excluded from its scope. When elaborating their NDCs, Parties are expected to take into consideration the assessment of collective ambition undertaken in the Global Stocktake. Collectively, the implementation of the NDCs will contribute to achieving the goals of globally peaking and subsequently reducing greenhouse gas emissions to achieve 'a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the century' (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.2).

According to decision 6/CMA.3 (UNFCCC 2021d), the next batch of NDCs is due in 2025, following the first Global Stocktake, which was concluded in 2023. **Parties are encouraged to establish targets for 2035**. The first Global Stocktake noted that collective action still falls short of what is required to keep the global temperature increase below the levels set out in the Paris Agreement. It also called for specific mitigation actions relating to land and marine ecosystems, energy systems and transport.

The Parties are required to submit their NDCs 9 to 12 months before the relevant meeting of the Parties (CMA). This allows time for clarity, transparency and understanding of the NDCs and gives the UNFCCC Secretariat sufficient time to prepare a synthesis report (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015a). In the past, however, only a minority of Parties have respected this deadline. As of August 2025, a total of 26 Parties had submitted a new NDC, as of September 2025, a total of 54<sup>3</sup>. The early submission of NDCs and their level of ambition are important because they indicate political will, which may boost the cooperative spirit of Parties to take decisions at the conference that may significantly advance the implementation of the Paris Agreement.

In the Paris Agreement, the Parties set long-term mitigation goals for the second half of this century and established a five-year policy cycle for NDCs. The Paris Agreement acts as a link between setting long-term and short-term targets. It also includes an obligation relating to **long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies**, stating that all Parties 'should strive to formulate and communicate' a long-term strategy (UNFCCC 2015b, Article 4.19).

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<sup>3</sup> All NDCs can be accessed via the NDC registry: UNFCCC (2025a), NDC registry, available at <https://unfccc.int/NDCREG>.

Adopting a long-term approach to climate policy planning – for example, by setting a goal to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050 – is essential for countries to ensure their successive NDCs and their level of ambition align with a pathway consistent with achieving their development goals and the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. It also allows for a better assessment of collective ambition and progress. Hence, the CMA has urged Parties to prepare or revise their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, a call that was reiterated in the first Global Stocktake. As of September 2025, a total of 79 Parties had submitted long-term strategies<sup>4</sup>.

The following agenda items and issues relating to mitigation are currently being negotiated. They all share a focus on the implementation of mitigation action.

### 3.1.2. Mitigation ambition and implementation work programme

The Parties agreed to engage in a '**mitigation ambition and implementation work programme**' to address the fact that the targets and measures of the current NDCs are insufficient to collectively achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. The objective of the work programme is to 'urgently scale up mitigation ambition and implementation' before 2030. Scientific assessments deem the current decade critical for staying below the temperature limits specified in the Paris Agreement. The modalities of the work program were adopted in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt (decision 4/CMA.4)<sup>5</sup>. Starting in 2023 and ending in 2026, the work programme consists of two **global dialogues**, investment-focused events designed to unlock finance, and regional events.

The discussions undertaken in the dialogues find their way back to the negotiations and political discussions in three ways. Firstly, the subsidiary bodies are mandated to consider progress and key findings of the work programme and to prepare a decision for adoption by the CMA. Secondly, the Secretariat and the co-chairs of the dialogues are tasked with preparing a report on the global dialogues for consideration by the CMA<sup>6</sup>. Thirdly, the co-chairs present the annual report to the ministers gathering at the annual high-level **ministerial round table on creating pre-2030 ambition**. The work programme is designed to complement the Global Stocktake.

The topics of the work programme are decided at the beginning of each year, taking submissions from Parties and observers into consideration. In 2025, the dialogues focused on the waste sector, which is an important source of methane emissions in many countries. Table 4 provides an overview of the topics that have been addressed by the work programme thus far. In terms of the upcoming negotiations, diverging views can be expected on how much and what substance arising from the global dialogues should be included in the decision put forward to the CMA.

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<sup>4</sup> Current long-term strategy submissions can be found on the dedicated portal: UNFCCC (2025m), long-term strategies portal, available at <https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/long-term-strategies>.

<sup>5</sup> The dedicated landing page for the work programme can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025u), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work program, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/mitigation/workstreams/mitigation-work-programme>.

<sup>6</sup> The annual reports of 2023 and 2024 can be found here: UNFCCC (2023d), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/631986>, UNFCCC (2024f), Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/641886>.

It should be noted that the work programme operates in a ‘non-prescriptive, non-punitive, facilitative’ manner and is not mandated to impose new targets or goals.

Table 4: Overview of topics addressed under the Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme

Year	Topic of global dialogues and investment-focused events
2023	Accelerating the just energy transition
2024	Cities: buildings and urban systems
2025	Actions and solutions in the waste sector, including through circular economy approaches

Source: Authors’ own compilation.

Parties will also continue their deliberations on creating a digital platform that serves to improve collaboration between governments and sources of finance for concrete projects. While some Parties see such a platform as a useful tool, others consider it a potential distraction from the need to channel finance to mitigation action now.

### 3.1.3. United Arab Emirates’ Just Transition Work Programme

The preamble to the Paris Agreement refers to the need for a ‘just transition of the workforce’. This highlights the importance that the Parties ascribed to ensuring that the economic shifts towards a low carbon and resilient economy do not create or exacerbate inequalities. Building on the brief mention of this issue in the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed to establish a **Just Transition Work Programme** in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022 (decision 1/CMA.4) and agreed on its modalities the following year (decision 3/CMA.5)<sup>7</sup>. The **dialogues and ministerial round table** taking place as part of the work programme focus on pathways for achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement, taking into account equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities and national circumstances. The work programme addresses the transitions of energy systems, the workforce and socio-economic implications and considers how just transition pathways can mitigate the potential negative impacts of policies and measures that drive the transition. The specific topics for discussion at the dialogues and ministerial round tables are chosen based on submissions from Parties and observers. **Table 5** provides an overview of the dialogues conducted thus far.

<sup>7</sup> The landing page of the just transition work programme can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025y), United Arab Emirates Just Transition Work Programme, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/just-transition/united-arab-emirates-just-transition-work-programme>.

Table 5: Overview of topics discussed under the just transition work programme

Dialogue number	Year	Topic
1	2024	Just Transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement through NDCs, National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) and LT-LEDs
2	2024	Ensuring support for people-centric and equitable just transition pathways with a focus on the whole-of-society approach and the workforce.
3	2025	Approaches to enhancing adaptation and climate resilience in the context of just transitions
4	2025	Just energy transition pathways and holistic approaches to just transitions including socioeconomic, workforce, social protection and other dimensions, based on nationally defined development priorities

Source: Authors' own compilation.

Unlike the work programme on mitigation ambition, the work programme on just transition is implemented directly by the subsidiary bodies, which use the discussions under the dialogue to prepare decisions that may be adopted by the CMA. The Secretariat and the co-chairs of the subsidiary bodies are tasked with producing annual summaries of the dialogues, supporting the deliberations by Parties.

At their next session, the subsidiary bodies will continue their deliberations on a draft decision for the CMA. Contentious issues include how to capture the key messages from the dialogues, for example on the energy transition, whether to address unilateral trade measures, and whether to make changes to the implementation modalities of the work programme.

**BOX 2: IMPACTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSE MEASURES**

Addressing the impacts of implementing response measures is closely related to the issues of a just transition. It involves taking action to address the cross-border negative impacts of implementing climate policies and to maximise positive impacts. This issue has been on the negotiating agenda since the UNFCCC was adopted and is also addressed in the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. It is currently addressed in the **'Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures'**, which was established in 2011 and serves all three instruments (Convention, Kyoto Protocol, Paris Agreement). In addition, this forum was complemented by the **Katowice Committee of Experts** on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures, which was established in 2018. A decision on this matter is usually adopted at each conference, but currently the Parties disagree on how to address unilateral trade measures and on the relationship between the work on response measures and on just transition.

### 3.1.4. Further guidance on features of the NDCs

The mandate to discuss further **guidance on features of the NDCs** was given in Paris (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015a) and as part of the Katowice Rulebook (decision 4/CMA.1, UNFCCC 2018b). There is currently no definition of what constitutes a feature of an NDC. However, the features are generally understood to be the characteristics of an NDC. Parties agreed that the features of NDCs 'are outlined in the relevant provisions of the Paris Agreement'. These include, for example, that they are communicated every five years, the progression in ambition, that Parties need to account for them and provide information on clarity, transparency and understanding, as well as their nationally determined nature. Parties also agreed to continue deliberations on further guidance in 2024.

The contentious issues covered by this agenda item include:

- The question of whether there is a need to define any additional features beyond those set out in the Paris Agreement. For example, the African Group of Negotiators, Norway and Chile consider this to be unnecessary, while other Parties support the addition of features beyond those set out in the Paris Agreement;
- Should guidance on additional features be provided, the Parties would need to agree on whether it should relate only to mitigation or also to adaptation and means of implementation. Saudi Arabia and Grupo Sur propose that features should address finance, while developed countries oppose this; and
- Some Parties and groups, such as the European Union, the Alliance of Small Island States and Switzerland, are calling for guidance on features that could help to improve the ambition level and comparability of NDCs.

This could be achieved by providing guidance on how the NDCs should respond to the mitigation outcomes of the Global Stocktake, or on the type of target they should include.

Deliberations on features are closely linked to the principles of differentiation and equity, which lie at the heart of the Convention, and which were carefully operationalised in the Paris Agreement. Ultimately, any potential guidance on features will need to respect the nationally determined nature of NDCs. The Parties' views as to whether a feature infringes on national determination are fundamentally opposed. The fact that the draft decision discussed during COP29 only included different options for when to defer the discussions highlights how contentious this topic is.

## 3.2. Voluntary cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement

### 3.2.1. Overview of the rulebook

The rules governing Article 6 were adopted at three conferences. At COP26 in Glasgow, the foundational rules on Article 6 were adopted but some implementation issues remained unaddressed. These were finalised at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, COP28 at Dubai (Article 6.8 only), and COP29 in Baku. As a result of the decisions made in Baku, the rulebook for Article 6 was completed. It will be reconsidered in 2028 when a review of Article 6 will take place. Accordingly, the focus of the COP agenda on Article 6 has shifted from development of the rules towards implementation.

#### a. Article 6.2 – A framework for engaging in international carbon markets and accounting for transfers

The decisions under Article 6.2 establish comprehensive accounting rules for the international transfer of carbon market units between Parties engaging in cooperative approaches: a Party that sells Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs, i.e. emission reductions or removals achieved by the Party) makes an addition to its emission level, while a Party acquiring ITMOs makes a subtraction. Both countries compare the adjusted emissions balance to their NDC target level when tracking progress towards implementing and achieving their NDC. The additions and subtractions are known as '**corresponding adjustments**' and ensure that only the buyer country can use transferred emission reductions, and thus avoids 'double counting' (Schneider et al. 2019).

The rules for cooperative approaches under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement also specify that carbon credits used for the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) are considered ITMOs. Hence, they are also subject to corresponding adjustments and must be reflected in the host country's emissions balance, avoiding double counting of such carbon credits. In addition, ITMOs may be used for 'other purposes', which may, for example, include the use by corporates to achieve voluntary climate mitigation goals.

The accounting rules also prohibit any carry-over of carbon market units from one NDC period to the next period (UNFCCC 2021a). This prevents countries from generating large amounts of carbon market units which are not backed by actual emission reductions and carrying them forward to achieve future climate targets. More details on the accounting rules and on the integrity principles for cooperative approaches agreed upon in Glasgow can be found in, for example, Moosmann et al. (2022).

The decision reached at COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh included further specifications of the registry infrastructure, the establishment of a platform for information reported by countries (including a 'centralized accounting and reporting platform' and an 'Article 6 database'), review guidelines and report outlines (UNFCCC 2022).

At COP29 in Baku, further important elements of the accounting framework were adopted. This includes specific guidance on the information to be incorporated in the authorisation of ITMOs, the finalisation of the agreed electronic format for reporting on ITMO transactions, and an agreement on the international registry system, including connections between different registries.

#### b. Article 6.4 – The Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM)

At COP26 in Glasgow, comprehensive rules were established for the new Article 6.4 **Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM)**. The PACM is overseen by a UN body, known as the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body. In many ways, the rules constitute a paradigm shift compared to the CDM established under the Kyoto Protocol. They contain new principles for demonstrating that the mitigation activities are additional, meaning that they would not have otherwise been implemented. They also require that more ambitious baselines are set that are aligned with achieving the Paris Agreement goals, that robust environmental and social safeguards are applied, and that a grievance mechanism to appeal decisions is established (UNFCCC 2021b).

The **achieved emission reductions should be shared between the seller country and the buyer country**, with 2% accruing to the atmosphere, referred to as the overall mitigation in global emissions (OMGE). In addition, a share of proceeds (SOP) must be transferred to the Adaptation Fund, which was a key demand from many developing countries. The application of such a SOP and the implementation of OMGE is mandatory under Article 6.4 and 'strongly encouraged' under Article 6.2.

At COP29 in Baku, the Parties agreed on **further guidance on the implementation of the mechanism**. At the first day of the conference, Parties endorsed two key standards developed by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body: one on requirements for methodologies and one on requirements for mitigation activities involving removals. The latter includes mainly provisions for addressing non-permanence.

Following the endorsement of these two overarching standards, the Supervisory Body initiated and accelerated work to implement the mechanism. This includes the adoption of standards on demonstrating additionality, establishing baselines, and adhering to environmental and social safeguards. The Supervisory Body further aims to adopt a standard on non-permanence and a first methodology to quantify emission reductions by the time of COP30.

#### c. Phasing out the Clean Development Mechanism

When adopting the rules for Article 6 at the COP in Glasgow, the Parties also agreed to phase out the CDM. Specifically, they agreed that no certified emission reductions (CERs) can be issued for emission reductions occurring after 2020. Requests for registration and issuance of new CERs ended in June 2023, when the process for receiving requests under Article 6.4 was set up. However, under certain conditions, CDM projects can be transitioned to the new PACM and continue to issue carbon credits for emission reductions occurring from 2021 onwards. In addition, approx. 300 million CERs could be used directly to achieve NDCs after 2020 (Fearnehough et al. 2021).

As far as **ongoing activities under the CDM** are concerned, the Parties are still discussing how to phase them out. These include the issuance of CERs, work on methodologies and the CDM accreditation system. The possibility of forwarding the remaining funds in the CDM trust fund to the Adaptation Fund and other carbon-market related matters is also under discussion. At the SBSTA session held in Bonn in June 2025, no substantial progress could be made on this matter, and negotiations will continue in Belém.

### 3.2.2. Issues at stake at COP30 in Belém

Following the finalisation of the rulebook for Article 6 at COP29 in Baku, matters related to Article 6 will be a less important agenda item at COP30 in Belém.

Under Article 6.2, Parties will consider a report by the UNFCCC Secretariat that compiles and synthesises the **results of the Article 6 technical expert review** and identifies recurring themes and lessons learned. The first technical expert reviews of reports by countries on their implementation of Article 6 revealed considerable shortcomings, including with regard to ensuring environmental integrity.

Under Article 6.4, the Parties will consider the **annual report of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body** on the implementation of the PACM. The Parties have the option of providing the Supervisory Body with additional guidance on the implementation of the mechanism.

The Parties will also consider once again the **phase-out of the CDM**, given that no agreement on this matter could be reached at COP28 in Dubai or COP29 in Baku. At the two last conferences, Brazil was the most vocal Party in supporting the continuation of the CDM. It remains to be seen whether progress on this matter can be made under the Brazilian COP presidency.

## 3.3. Adaptation

Article 7 of the Paris Agreement establishes a **Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)** through which countries have agreed to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience and reduce vulnerability to climate change. For developing countries, anchoring a goal on adaptation in the Paris Agreement alongside its temperature limits was a key priority as they wanted to ensure that the mitigation and adaptation aspects of the global community's response to climate change are equitably reflected in the agreement.

However, in contrast to the Paris Agreement's mitigation goals, which include numerical temperature limits, the GGA was less clearly defined. Therefore, the Parties to the agreement decided in 2021 to establish the **Glasgow-Sharm-el-Sheikh work programme on the global goal on adaptation** (UNFCCC 2021c), with the objective of better understanding, conceptualising, and ultimately achieving the GGA. At the conclusion of this work programme, the Parties adopted the United Arab Emirates (UAE) Framework for Global Climate Resilience at COP28 in Dubai in 2023 (UNFCCC 2023c). The framework includes several thematic and dimensional targets for adaptation, which should guide the achievement of the GGA (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).

Figure 2: UAE Framework – thematic targets by 2030 and progressively beyond

Water	Significantly reduce climate-induced water scarcity
	Enhance climate resilience to water-related hazards
	Climate-resilient sanitation
	Access to safe and affordable potable water for all
Food security	Attain climate-resilient food and agricultural production and supply
	Increase sustainable and regenerative production
	Equitable access to adequate food and nutrition for all
Health	Attain resilience against climate change related health impacts
	Promote climate-resilient health services and significantly reduce climate-related morbidity and mortality, particularly in the most vulnerable communities
Ecosystems	Reduce climate impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity, and accelerate the use of ecosystem-based adaptation and nature-based solutions, including through their management, enhancement, restoration and conservation and the protection of terrestrial, inland water, mountain, marine and coastal ecosystems
Infrastructure	Increase the resilience of infrastructure and human settlements to climate change impacts to ensure basic and continuous essential services for all
	Minimise climate-related impacts on infrastructure and human settlements
Poverty	Substantially reduce the adverse effects of climate change on poverty eradication and livelihoods, in particular by promoting the use of adaptive social protection measures for all
Cultural heritage	Protect cultural heritage from the impacts of climate-related risks by developing adaptive strategies for preserving cultural practices and heritage sites and by designing climate-resilient infrastructure, guided by traditional knowledge, indigenous peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems

Source: Moosmann et al. (2024).

Figure 3: Targets related to the dimensions of the iterative adaptation cycle

By 2030	<p>All Parties to conduct up-to-date assessments of climate hazards, climate change impacts and exposure risks.</p> <p>All Parties to have in place country-driven, gender responsive, participatory and fully transparent national adaptation plans, policy instruments, and planning processes or strategies.</p> <p>All Parties to have progressed in implementing their national adaptation plans, policies and strategies.</p> <p>All Parties to have designed, established and operationalised a system for monitoring, evaluation, and learning for their national adaptation efforts.</p>
By 2027	<p>All Parties to have established multi-hazard early warning systems, climate information services for risk reduction and systematic observation to support improved climate-related data, information and services.</p>

Source: Moosmann et al. (2024).

To facilitate an effective measurement of overall progress made towards the GGA through the periodic Global Stocktake of the Paris Agreement, the Parties at COP28 established the UAE–Belém work programme on the development of indicators. The work programme received a mandate for a period of two years and the Parties are expected to adopt conclusions from the work programme at COP30 in Belém.

During its first year in 2024, deliberations under the UAE–Belém work programme focused on **mapping potentially suitable indicators** by reviewing those of existing multilateral frameworks that have interlinkages with the GGA such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) or the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. The process used for this mapping exercise included submission by the Parties, consultation of experts<sup>8</sup> as well as dedicated workshops.

At COP29 in Baku, the Parties considered progress made under the work programme and adopted a decision which further clarifies the nature of the outcome of the work programme (UNFCCC 2024c). In this decision, the Parties decided that the outcome of the work programme should include a set of no more than 100 globally applicable indicators to inform and analyse relevant global trends as well as a ‘menu of indicators’ that Parties can choose to report on given their national circumstances. At COP29, the Parties further agreed that the outcome should include quantitative and qualitative indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, including means of implementation. This has been interpreted as a concession to developing countries because it opens the door for including quantitative targets on adaptation finance in the final indicator list.

<sup>8</sup> A list of the experts selected to assist in the technical work under the UAE–Belém work programme can be viewed here: UNFCCC (2025w), The experts convened by the SB Chairs to assist in the technical work under the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme, available at <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/19.09%20Expert%20table%20for%20web%20publishing.pdf>.

In May 2025, experts met at a mandated workshop to **further refine the indicators**<sup>9</sup>. The UNFCCC Secretariat subsequently released a technical report summarising the progress made by technical experts (UNFCCC 2025v). This was accompanied by a consolidated list of indicator options<sup>10</sup>, a consolidated progress report by the technical experts (UNFCCC 2025f) as well as technical reports on progress made on each of the targets<sup>11</sup>.

After the session of the subsidiary bodies in June 2025, experts continued the consolidation of the indicators, with the goal of reducing the number of indicators to a maximum of 100 (UNFCCC 2025s). A workshop for the Parties to consider the final list of indicators will be convened on 3 and 4 October 2025. This will be the last meeting under the work programme and the expectation is that Parties will use the meeting to reach an agreement on the final list of indicators. Any outstanding issues will be forwarded to the conference in Belém, where the work programme is expected to close, and the Parties are expected to adopt a decision containing the final indicators.

Another adaptation related outcome from COP29 in Baku was the adoption of the **Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR)** with the objective of creating a process for supporting the implementation of the GGA beyond COP30 (paragraph 29 of decision 3/CMA.6, UNFCCC 2024c). The Parties requested the subsidiary bodies to develop modalities for work under the roadmap. In their submissions, the Parties expressed divergent views on what such modalities should look like. Some Parties such as the European Union, Canada and the United Kingdom expressed a preference for not launching additional technical processes under the BAR but to focus on efforts to conclude existing workstreams first or launch the BAR at COP30 through a high-level event or declaration. Other Parties such as the Arab Group stressed the need for additional technical work. At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, no progress was made on this issue. The Parties will continue to negotiate modalities and for of launching the BAR at COP30.

At COP29, the Parties further established the **Baku high-level dialogue on adaptation**, which will be convened by the COP presidency along with the presidency of the previous COP at the margins of each COP. The objective of the dialogue is to bring high-level decision makers together to identify ways to enhance the implementation of the UAE Framework for Global Resilience. It will form one component of the BAR.

### 3.4. Loss and damage

At the most recent COPs, negotiations on the topic of loss and damage mostly focused on the question of how countries can mobilise funding to support developing countries in response to the adverse effects of climate change. The establishment of a new dedicated multilateral fund, the **Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD)**, at COP28 represents significant progress in this context.

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<sup>9</sup> The workshop proceedings are summarised here: UNFCCC (2025x), Third workshop under the United Arab Emirates–Belém work programme, available at [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2025\\_01.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sb2025_01.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> The list of indicator options is available as an Excel file here: UNFCCC (2025e), Consolidated list of indicator options, UAE–Belém work programme on indicators, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/647049>.

<sup>11</sup> Progress reports for each of the targets are made available here: UNFCCC (2025t), Reports by technical experts, UAE–Belém work programme, May 2025, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/the-big-picture/introduction-to-adaptation-and-resilience/loss-and-damage/reports-by-technical-experts-uae-belem-work-programme-may-2025>.

The FRLD is hosted by the World Bank; its headquarters are located in Manila, the Philippines. As of 7 April 2025, the FRLD had received approximately USD 768 million in pledges from 27 contributors, of which approximately USD 365 million has been made available to the FRLD trust fund.<sup>12,13</sup> In addition to contributions made by several of its Member States, the European Union pledged EUR 25 million. In 2025, the FRLD Board's work has focused on developing the fund's funding criteria and a resource mobilisation strategy.

The main issue for the loss and damage negotiations at COP30 is the third **review of the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM)** (see section 2.2.5 for an overview of its role under the Paris Agreement). As with all constituted bodies under the UNFCCC, Parties will periodically review the effectiveness of the WIM. These reviews provide an opportunity for the Parties to refine existing mandates or assign new functions to these bodies. They are guided by terms of reference that are jointly developed by the Parties at preceding COPs.<sup>14</sup> Initially, the third review of the WIM was scheduled to conclude at COP29 in 2024. However, the Parties did not reach a consensus on a decision and agreed to continue negotiations at subsequent meetings<sup>15</sup>.

The main issues on which the Parties have divergent views include the following:

- **The cost-effectiveness of the secretariat services provided to the Santiago Network** by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).

Further resources will be required to ensure the continuity of the secretariat services to the Santiago Network. It is currently unclear whether developed countries will provide the secretariat with additional budget contributions;

- **The development of a regular report on loss and damage**

During the review of the WIM, some Parties suggested preparing a regular report that synthesises information on critical issues and lessons learned on loss and damage;

It is proposed that this report should include information on the scientific, policy, financial and technological dimensions of loss and damage and that it would serve as a centralised source of information on loss and damage under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement. Issues of divergence on the preparation of the report include, for example, the question of whether the report should quantify the resources required for Parties to respond to loss and damage; and

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<sup>12</sup> For an overview of pledges, see the following website: UNFCCC (2025q), Pledges to the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/funds-entities-bodies/fund-for-responding-to-loss-and-damage/pledges-to-the-fund-for-responding-to-loss-and-damage>.

<sup>13</sup> For an overview of current resources of the FRLD Trust Fund, see World Bank Group (2025), Financial Intermediary Funds (FIFs), available at <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/fird#2>.

<sup>14</sup> The terms of reference for the third review of the WIM are available here: UNFCCC (2024g), Terms of reference for the 2024 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/638848>.

<sup>15</sup> At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, the Parties worked on an informal note, which will be forwarded to COP30 to serve as the basis for further negotiations. The informal note can be accessed here: UNFCCC (2025k), Informal Note on SBI 62 agenda sub-item 13(b) / SBSTA agenda sub-item 6(b), available at [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM\\_dt\\_sb62\\_0.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/WIM_dt_sb62_0.pdf).

- **The acknowledgement of a loss and damage finance gap**

The informal note currently includes an acknowledgement of the 'significant gaps that remain in responding to the increased scale and frequency of loss and damage, and the associated economic and non-economic losses and recognises the need for urgent and enhanced action and support for averting, minimising and addressing loss and damage associated with climate change impacts'. This language comes from paragraph 19 of the decision on the new collective quantified goal on finance (UNFCCC 2024b).

The divergent views on the latter two issues have to be seen in the broader context of mobilising climate finance for loss and damage. During the negotiations on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance (see section 3.5.1 for a detailed discussion), a key objective for developing countries was to establish quantified sub-goals for adaptation and loss and damage. There was no consensus on these proposals and the NCQG does therefore not contain a quantified goal for loss and damage finance. However, proposals to acknowledge the finance gap in the third review of the WIM and for the preparation of regular reports on the status of loss and damage could pave the way for further discussions on numerical targets for loss and damage finance.

A cross-cutting topic in the loss and damage negotiations, which also features in the WIM review discussions, is the **coherence and complementarity** of the different bodies and structures established under the Convention to address loss and damage. There are several frameworks and constituted bodies which have similar mandates of facilitating and mobilising more support to developing countries, notably the FRLD, the WIM and its Executive Committee as well as the Santiago Network and its advisory board. Close coordination between the different bodies is essential to avoid the duplication of efforts and the creation of inefficiencies in the delivery of support. This is especially relevant for the emerging delineation of tasks between the FRLD and the Santiago Network. The latter's mandate is to facilitate access to and provide technical assistance to developing countries in addressing loss and damage. The FRLD, which is currently developing its funding modalities, could build on the work of the Santiago Network where relevant, allowing it to focus on supporting project proposals developed with technical assistance from the Santiago Network.

A development which likely will influence the loss and damage negotiations at COP30 is the advisory opinion of **the International Court of Justice** (ICJ 2025) that countries are obliged to make adequate contributions to limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. In its advisory opinion, the ICJ further stated that countries which fail to meet their obligations can, in principle, face liability for the climate harms resulting from such a failure (Carbon Brief 2025). Linking the consideration of loss and damage under the UNFCCC to the question of liability is something that developed countries have carefully tried to avoid at past COPs.

The ICJ's advisory opinion will likely bring the issue back to the negotiating table as it provides the most vulnerable countries with important new arguments to discuss the creation of international mechanisms for addressing liability for loss and damage due to the adverse effects of climate change.

## 3.5. Support

### 3.5.1. Finance

Climate finance remains a key topic at COP30. The **new collective quantified goal (NCQG)** was adopted at COP29, which was considered a ‘finance COP’ due to the importance attached to defining a new climate finance goal (WRI 2024b). At the upcoming conference in Belém, climate finance will again be a key issue in the negotiations, particularly with a view to gaining further clarity on how to reach the targets set with the NCQG.

#### a. The goal to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020

The NCQG replaces the **previous goal to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion annually by 2020**. The USD 100 billion goal was adopted at COP 15 in 2009, when developed country Parties collectively committed to ‘mobilise jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a variety of sources’. This was an important signal to continue global cooperation in mitigating and adapting to climate change.

According to data by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the USD 100 billion goal was not reached in 2020, with USD 83.3 billion having been provided and mobilised in that year. However, it was met for the first time in 2022, when USD 115.9 billion was provided and mobilised by developed countries (OECD 2024). Bilateral and multilateral public climate finance makes up the largest part of the funding provided, accounting for about 80% of this figure (USD 91.6 billion). The other 20% comes from mobilised private finance and climate-related export credits. Further information on climate finance flows up to 2022 are available in the Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows<sup>16</sup> prepared by the UNFCCC Standing Committee on Finance.

However, recipient countries and NGOs have repeatedly criticised donors for overstating their financial contributions to recipient countries by including non-concessional instruments (i.e. instruments offered on market-based terms) in their calculations as well as accounting for non-concessional instruments at face value, which is not compatible with the requirements set for Official Development Assistance (ODA) (ACT Alliance EU 2021; Oxfam 2023). According to estimates made by Oxfam, climate finance provided in grants and grant-equivalent amounts totalled about USD 28–35 billion in 2022, which is a vastly lower sum than the one estimated by the OECD (Oxfam 2024).

For building trust in the negotiations, demonstrating progress in delivering the financial means promised with the goal has been of key importance since it was adopted. Initially, **measuring progress towards the USD 100 billion goal** was challenging as methodologies for measuring and reporting the flows covered by the goal have only gradually been established and implemented by developed countries along with multilateral institutions such as the OECD.

Harmonising measurement and reporting methodologies has enhanced the transparency of climate finance over time; however, gaps and inconsistencies in reporting remain (e.g. regarding reporting on private finance mobilised or reporting grant equivalents).

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<sup>16</sup> Standing Committee on Finance (2024), Sixth Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/resources/biennial-assessment-and-overview-of-climate-finance-flows>.

Although developed countries only achieved their commitment to provide and mobilise USD 100 billion of climate finance after a delay and despite continuous criticism from various actors, the USD 100 billion goal is considered to have successfully increased the amount of support available to developing countries for climate action. Additionally, it has increased the attention given to finance flows more broadly as an important lever for the climate transition under the UNFCCC. This broader perspective is also reflected in Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement, which sets the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development.

#### b. The new collective quantified goal on climate finance

At COP21 in 2015, the USD 100 billion goal was extended to 2025 and an ad hoc work programme was established to support the creation of a **new collective quantified goal** at COP29 which should guide mobilisation efforts after 2025 (paragraph 53 of decision 1/CP21, UNFCCC 2015a). Under the work programme, eleven technical expert dialogues took place that discussed how the NCQG should be defined, particularly regarding overall funding levels, the time frame for reaching the goal, eligible sources, contributors and recipients. The negotiations on the NCQG thus had to address a number of highly political questions, including the extent to which other Parties besides developed countries that are 'in a position to do so' should contribute to the target as well and whether the goal should be divided into sub-goals for mitigation and adaptation finance.

The decision on the NCQG adopted in Baku in 2024 – at the last minute and after difficult negotiations – sets a **goal of providing at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 to support climate action in developing countries**, with developed country Parties taking the lead in providing these funds (Decision 1/CMA.6, paragraph 8, UNFCCC 2024b).

At the same time, the decision calls on all actors to scale up **both public and private finance to developing economies to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035** (paragraph 7). Furthermore, the NCQG also aims **to triple the annual outflows of the climate funds between 2022 and 2030** (paragraph 16). The NCQG acknowledges that finance needs of developing countries by far exceed the climate finance provided so far (paragraph 3). Additionally, it puts a new emphasis on the delivery of impacts through climate finance by requesting financial institutions, including multilateral development banks and multilateral climate funds to enhance the effectiveness of climate finance provided and mobilised (paragraphs 23 and 24) as well as to enhance access to climate finance. The decision on the NCQG does not set a specific target for adaptation finance; it only stipulates that financial resources should aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation (paragraph 17)<sup>17</sup>. No specific target is set for funding for loss and damage either.

The **USD 300 billion goal** could be understood as a continuation of the previous USD 100 billion goal, primarily covering **bilateral and multilateral public finance, as well as private finance mobilised by public interventions**. However, the CMA Decision does not clearly indicate this, only stating that the goal should be met from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral,

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<sup>17</sup> The COP26 commitment of developed countries to at least double adaptation finance by 2025 compared to 2019 levels is the latest specific goal set for adaptation finance.

including alternative sources. Developing countries are encouraged to (voluntarily) contribute to the USD 300 billion goal, according to paragraph 9 of the NCQG decision.<sup>18</sup>

The broader **USD 1.3 trillion goal** can be understood to encompass the **total climate finance flows to developing countries and could include, from all countries as contributors, a diverse and broad range of financial sources** besides public funds and private investments, including alternative and innovative mechanisms<sup>19</sup> such as taxes on fossil fuels or rechannelled International Monetary Fund special drawing rights. Meeting the USD 1.3 trillion goal will require significant additional private sector investment in climate action. This is particularly important given the political opposition to international climate finance in many developed nations, which makes it challenging to enhance public bilateral climate finance (WRI 2025). In particular, the United States decided to cease all its funding pledged under the UNFCCC in 2025, and to withdraw from the Paris Agreement (including contributions to the Green Climate Fund and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage) and to cut most climate-related aid (Harvey 2025). According to estimates, this might reduce global public climate finance flows by 10% (Gabbatiss 2025). The latest report by the Independent High-Level Expert Group on Climate Finance assumes that about half of the USD 1.3 trillion will be provided in the form of international private finance (Bhattacharya et al. 2024).

However, **the specific scope of the goals included in the NCQG in terms of financial instruments or accounting methodologies has not been defined (yet)** in the UNFCCC process. For measuring progress towards achieving the NCQG, the NCQG decision requests developed country Parties to provide information on support provided through common tabular formats and encourages other Parties providing support to do so as well (paragraph 28 NCQG decision). The Standing Committee on Finance (SCF) will report biennially on the progress made towards achieving the NCQG milestones (paragraph 30 and 32 NCQG decision). However, the broadened scope of the NCQG will complicate the tracking, attribution and reporting of contributions and require additional indicators and methodologies to be developed (Jachnik 2025) and additional data sources to be included (UNFCCC Secretariat 2025).

First analyses suggest that the USD 300 billion goal can be reached if Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) continue along their reformed path and countries maintain their recent levels of climate finance contributions. Yet, it remains important to ensure that the funds provided match resource needs and that finance reaches those who need it most urgently (WRI 2025). Further opportunities for countries to work towards achieving the NCQG include working with international financial institutions on climate-orientated reform, using innovative finance and capital enhancement and engaging for climate levies that can be channelled towards international climate finance through the Global Solidarity Levies Task Force (WRI 2024a).

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<sup>18</sup> This may include multilateral development bank outflows that are attributable to developing countries as well, see WRI (2024a), Key Outcomes from COP29: Unpacking the New Global Climate Finance Goal and Beyond, available at <https://www.wri.org/insights/cop29-outcomes-next-steps>.

<sup>19</sup> The inclusion of 'innovative sources' in international climate finance flows was rejected by the LDCs at COP29, see (IISD 2024), summary of the Baku Climate Change Conference, <https://enb.iisd.org/baku-un-climate-change-conference-cop29-summary>.

### c. The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T

To further operationalise the NCQG, the decision of COP29 also launched **The Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T** (UNFCCC 2025d). This process is expected to set out how climate finance for developing countries can be scaled up to meet the USD 1.3 trillion target. The COP30 and COP29 Presidencies will jointly propose their report on this roadmap at CMA7 at the conference in Belém. The report is expected to cover the following five topics: MDB reform, expanding concessional finance and climate funds, country platforms to boost domestic capacity, innovative financial instruments for private capital mobilisation and strengthening regulatory frameworks (ODI Global 2025).

At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, consultations on the roadmap revealed continuous conflicting views on the operationalisation of the NCQG, including the mix of public versus private finance, the role of non-concessional instruments and the focus to be put on adaptation finance (IISD 2025a). Overall, the session was marked by widespread disappointment among developing countries regarding the NCQG outcome. The adoption of the agendas was delayed by almost two days due to a proposal by the Group of Like-Minded Developing Countries to consider the implementation of developed countries' climate finance obligations under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement as a separate agenda item. This was opposed by the European Union, by the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) and other Parties who suggested a more holistic scope for the finance-related agenda items.

During the session, there was repeated disagreement among the Parties about the provision of climate finance, technology transfer and capacity building. Additionally, finance for adaptation emerged as a key and sensitive issue at the session. As part of a last minute compromise, the Parties agreed to **include indicators on the provision of adaptation finance in the list of indicators for measuring progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation** (IISD 2025b). Countries are expected to negotiate on and adopt these indicators at COP30. Enhancing public funding for adaptation was and is a key priority for developing countries in the light of the funding gap for adaptation (UNEP 2023).

Against the background of criticism from recipient countries and observers regarding the outcomes in the NCQG decision, it is important for developed countries to **demonstrate ambition with regard to the quantity and quality of climate finance**. This could involve providing further clarification on how access to climate finance can be enhanced or what constitutes a 'balance' of mitigation and adaptation finance. It is also important to enhance clarity around the roles and responsibilities to achieve the NCQG in the 'Baku to Belém' process before and at COP30. This will be crucial for building trust in the negotiations and supporting the communication and implementation of ambitious NDCs from developing countries (ODI Global 2024).

### d. Other negotiating items

Other negotiation items and developments related to climate finance since COP 29, besides the NCQG, include the following:

- **Operationalisation of Article 2.1(c):** The last two 'Sharm el-Sheikh dialogues' on how to operationalise Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement took place in 2025. This Article sets the goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. During the two workshops held in 2025, the Parties,

relevant organisations and stakeholders exchanged views on the scope of this Article and its complementarity with Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which focuses on the obligation of developed country Parties to provide climate finance;

- **Adaptation Fund:** At the SBI session in June 2025, the Parties discussed the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the purposes of the Paris Agreement, as well as the membership of the Adaptation Fund and its fifth review. These discussions will continue at COP30;
- **Guidance on the funds of the financial mechanism of the Convention:** This is a standing agenda item at every COP, where Parties have the opportunity to provide guidance to the operating entities of the financial mechanism. These are the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (Moosmann et al. 2024);
- In June 2025, the **Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development** took place in Seville, Spain. It concluded with the Seville Commitment, which reflects a growing political awareness of the links between the broader development finance framework and the UNFCCC decisions on climate finance. The Seville Commitment calls for resources to implement climate finance goals under the UNFCCC, as well as to support NDCs and national adaptation plans. It also emphasises the importance of transparency in climate finance reporting. It thus acknowledges that achieving the goals of the NCQG will be linked to discussions about reforms of the international financial architecture and to mobilising additional private finance for sustainable development (ODI Global 2025).

### 3.5.2. Technology

At COP29 in 2024, the Parties discussed the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). They decided to conduct a **review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC)**, which was established in 2010 as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism and is hosted by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Parties plan to decide whether to extend the term of the Climate Technology Centre at COP30. At the session of the subsidiary bodies held in June 2025, a draft text (UNFCCC 2025g) on extending the term was negotiated including an annex with revised functions of the CTC. At COP30, criteria for selecting a (new) host for the CTC will be discussed as part of this agenda item.

At COP29 and at the June 2025 session, the Parties also continued discussions regarding consideration of **linkages, collaboration and cooperation between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism**. They discussed various options for improving the comparability of the information on support available under the two mechanisms<sup>20</sup>.

The Parties also discussed the **Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer** and how the lessons learned can inform the operationalisation of the technology implementation programme (TIP),

<sup>20</sup> A draft text developed by the SBI will be the basis for continuing negotiations in Belém: (UNFCCC 2025h), Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, draft negotiating text, available at <https://unfccc.int/documents/648363>.

which was established by the decision on the Global Stocktake in 2023. The Secretariat was requested to prepare a report on the evaluation of the Poznan strategic programme, taking stock of progress, challenges, successes and lessons learned by the SBI session in June 2026. A decision on this matter at COP31 shall then inform the technology implementation programme.

The modalities and governing arrangements of the **technology implementation programme (TIP)** were discussed at COP29. The purpose of the TIP is defined as 'to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries, and to address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism' (UNFCCC 2023b). At COP29 and SBI62, views strongly diverged on the scope and mandate of the TIP. This included whether to focus on the outcomes of the GST, whether to prioritise specific technologies such as artificial intelligence, early warning systems, hydrogen or carbon capture and use or storage and whether to set quantifiable goals for the process. No consensus could be reached. Discussions will continue at SBI63 (IISD 2024; 2025b).

At COP29, the winner of the '**Artificial Intelligence (AI) Innovation Grand Challenge**' was honoured. This challenge intended to promote the development of AI-powered climate solutions in developing countries. Dr. Letetia Addison of Trinidad and Tobago won the challenge at COP29 for an 'AI-driven climate resilience platform for SIDS,' which aims to promote the adaptation of SIDS to climate change impacts (UNFCCC 2024h). This initiative highlights the potential of AI to drive transformative change and support developing countries in addressing climate challenges (UNFCCC 2023a).

Like the previous COP, COP30 will also spotlight technological innovation through themed 'innovation challenges'. These include the 'Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) for People and Planet Innovation Challenge,' which aims to engage global innovators in developing climate solutions using DPI. Also, the 'AI for Climate Action Innovation Factory' will organise a live pitching session, focusing on AI-driven solutions from start-ups tackling environmental challenges. Once again, an AI for Climate Action Award will be bestowed (COP30 Brasil 2025b).

### 3.5.3. Capacity building

**The Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB)** provides capacity building support to implement NDCs, integrate climate considerations into national planning and budgeting, and address institutional gaps, for example.

At COP29, the PCCB's **annual technical progress report** for 2024 was discussed. The report highlights capacity building for designing holistic investment strategies, bankable projects and stakeholder engagement in mitigation and adaptation. For the next progress report, the Parties invited the PCCB to include information on how its work is linked to relevant outcomes of the GST. Furthermore, the Parties made a decision on the second review of the PCCB in which they extended the term of the PCCB for another five years.

COP29 also set out the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive **review of how the capacity-building framework is being implemented in developing countries under the Convention**.

The review commenced at SBI62 and will continue at the SBI session in Belém, alongside a review of related issues under the Kyoto Protocol. A decision on this may be adopted at COP30 (IISD 2024; 2025b).

Additionally, the **6<sup>th</sup> Capacity-Building Hub** took place at COP29, featuring 42 sessions with over 1,500 attendees. The sessions highlighted the need for enhanced national coordination between finance and environment ministries, fostering dialogue across the Rio Conventions, amplifying the voices of women, youth and Indigenous communities, leveraging innovative climate finance mechanisms (e.g. blended finance and Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance) and ensuring an equitable and transparent use of emerging technologies, including AI (UNFCCC 2025b).

At COP29, the key **role of the six UNFCCC Regional Collaboration Centres (RCCs)** in capacity building was also reaffirmed. Thirteen RCC events were held at the conference, featuring private sector engagement, regional-specific dialogues on NDCs, adaptation, Article 6 implementation, and climate finance (UNFCCC 2024a).

Regarding capacity building in the area of transparency, **the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency – Global Support Programme (CBIT-GSP)** was launched in 2023 to strengthen the institutional and technical capacities of developing countries. It aims to support developing countries in adhering to the enhanced transparency requirements outlined in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. For example, the CBIT provides tools and trainings to developing countries to help them prepare their Biennial Transparency Reports.<sup>21</sup>

### 3.6. Education, training and public awareness

The topics listed in Article 12 of the Paris Agreement – namely education, public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information – along with international cooperation, are summarised under the term **'Action for Climate Empowerment' (ACE)**. Under the ACE work programme, events are organised during each COP and session of the subsidiary bodies. Information on these events is available on the UNFCCC website<sup>22</sup>.

In addition, progress under the ACE work programme will be discussed at the Belém climate change conference under the SBI agenda item 'Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment'.

### 3.7. Transparency

The end of 2024 marked an important milestone for transparency under the Paris Agreement, as Parties were required to submit their **first Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs)**. By the deadline of 31 December 2024, 86 Parties had submitted a BTR; by 1 September 2025, a total of 106 Parties submitted a BTR (UNFCCC 2025i). Given that the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing

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<sup>21</sup> See the website of the Climate Transparency Platform: CBIT-GSP (2025) Climate Transparency Platform, available at <https://climate-transparency-platform.org/>.

<sup>22</sup> UNFCCC (2025a), Action for climate empowerment, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/education-and-youth/big-picture/ACE>.

States (SIDS) are not required to submit such a report under the Paris Agreement, this includes most Parties and covers a large share of global emissions.

These BTR submissions provide comparable information from developing and developed country Parties. Besides the main reports, the submissions include GHG inventory data, information on progress towards implementing the NDC, and information on support in tabular format. All reports and the tabular data are available on the UNFCCC website<sup>23</sup>. In addition to the mandatory elements, many Parties provided information on the non-mandatory topics of adaptation, loss and damage, and support needed and received (Moosmann 2025). A synthesis report of the submitted information will be published by the UNFCCC Secretariat ahead of COP30.

While there are no dedicated negotiations on BTRs on the COP30 agenda, several other aspects relating to transparency will be discussed at the conference:

- Under the CMA, Parties discuss the **provision of financial and technical support for reporting**. The background to this agenda item is that many developing countries face challenges in compiling GHG inventory data and other climate change-related information due to their limited resources, and support is needed in this area. At the conference in Belém, the Parties will discuss, inter alia, the results of a workshop on experiences in preparing the first BTR;
- Under the SBI, Parties will discuss the status of report **submissions under the Convention**. Although most climate change-related information is included in BTRs under the Paris Agreement, some reporting obligations remain under the Convention, including annual GHG inventories by developed countries and National Communications which are due every four years;
- The SBI will host a session of the **'Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress,'** during which Parties present the information reported in their BTRs and respond to questions posed by representatives of other Parties;
- The SBSTA agenda contains several items of a technical nature, such as the development of a GHG data interface and reports from technical expert reviews.

### 3.8. The Global Stocktake

The **first Global Stocktake was concluded in 2023** and constituted the main outcome of the COP28 climate change conference. Decision 1/CMA.5 (UNFCCC 2023b) documents the Parties' consensus on the state of implementation of the Paris Agreement. In this decision, the CMA notes with alarm the findings of the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report and calls on Parties to increase their ambition in terms of climate action and support. Table 6 provides an overview of the key messages of this decision.

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<sup>23</sup> UNFCCC (2025i), First Biennial Transparency Reports, available at <https://unfccc.int/first-biennial-transparency-reports>.

Table 6: Selected messages from the outcome of the first Global Stocktake

Topic	Key messages
Context and cross-cutting considerations	The CMA finds that 'Parties are not yet collectively on track towards achieving the purpose of the Paris Agreement and its long-term goals'.
Mitigation	Parties are called on to contribute to global efforts, inter alia the tripling of renewable energy capacity by 2030 and the transitioning away from fossil fuels.
Adaptation	Parties are urged to increase ambition towards the achievement of targets by 2030 in the areas of water, food, agriculture, health, and others.
Means of implementation and support	Adaptation finance will have to be significantly scaled up. Provision of support for activities to address loss and damage. Establishment of a technology implementation programme.
Loss and damage	Parties and relevant institutions are called on to improve coherence and synergies between efforts.
Response measures	Parties are encouraged to extend activities relating to the assessment of the impacts of the implementation of response measures.
International cooperation	Parties and non-Party stakeholders are urged to 'join efforts to accelerate delivery through inclusive, multilevel, gender-responsive and cooperative action.'
Guidance and way forward	An annual Global Stocktake dialogue and a 'Road Map to Mission 1.5' to enhance ambition in the next round of NDCs are launched.

Source: Decision 1/CMA.5, UNFCCC (2023b).

Notes: This table contains only a few key messages selected from the 196 paragraphs of decision 1/CMA.5.

It should be noted that the outcome of the first Global Stocktake constitutes a **compromise among all Parties**. Many Parties and stakeholders had called for more ambitious wording, which was not reflected in the final outcome. Several concepts, such as 'systems transformations' which are needed to effectively respond to climate change globally, had played an important role during the technical phase of the Global Stocktake, but were not included in the final CMA decision (Winkler and Akhtar 2025).

Ahead of COP30, when more and more new NDCs are being communicated, it will be critical to observe how the Parties have responded to the results of the Global Stocktake.

According to decision 4/CMA.1 (UNFCCC 2018b), Parties have to specify in their NDCs how their NDC preparation has been informed by the outcomes of the Global Stocktake.

COP30 will also see **follow-up discussions to the first Global Stocktake** under the subsidiary bodies. These will cover procedural and logistical elements and the report of the most recent Global Stocktake

dialogue, which took place in June 2025<sup>24</sup>, as well as the modalities of the 'United Arab Emirates (UAE) dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes'. The UAE dialogue was established in the finance section of the decision on the GST (paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5) and diverging views remain on the focus of this dialogue, i.e. whether it should primarily address finance aspects, or whether it should address all outcomes of the GST (IISD 2025b).

### 3.9. The Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement

The Committee to facilitate implementation of the Paris Agreement has been meeting two to three times a year since 2020. In cases in which a Party does not meet an obligation, such as the timely submission of an NDC or of a report, the Committee engages with this Party to facilitate resolution of this issue.

In 2025, the Committee had to address a large number of cases, as three mandatory deliverables were due under the Paris Agreement (for more information and links to these deliverables, see Table 3):

- **NDCs:** According to the decision on the adoption of the Paris Agreement (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015a), Parties are required to submit their NDCs at least nine to twelve months in advance of the relevant CMA session. For the NDCs due in 2025, the relevant date is 10 February 2025, nine months before the start of the climate change conference in Belém. By that date, only 13 Parties had submitted a new NDC. Following its meeting in April 2025, the Committee notified the Parties which had missed this reporting deadline (UNFCCC 2025r);
- **Biennial communications on financial support:** The third biennial communications under Article 9.5 with indicative information, including projected levels of financial support, were due on 31 December 2024. Three Parties submitted these communications after the deadline. As these submissions had been completed at the time of the Committee's meeting in April 2025, the Committee did not engage with these cases (UNFCCC 2025r); and
- **BTRs:** The deadline for submitting the first Biennial Transparency Report was 31 December 2024. At the time of the Committee's meeting in April 2025, 37 Parties had not submitted one or more of the mandatory elements of a BTR, and the Committee notified them accordingly (UNFCCC 2025r).

Under the Paris Agreement, the role of the Committee is a facilitative one, and it cannot sanction Parties that do not meet their obligations. This role is consistent with the overall approach of the Paris Agreement, which focuses on nationally determined action, rather than on central oversight.

At COP30 in Belém, the CMA will consider matters relating to the Committee. It can be expected that the CMA will discuss the annual report of the Committee, which will be published ahead of the conference. However, it is thought that the CMA will not request major changes in the work of the Committee.

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<sup>24</sup> UNFCCC (2025c), Annual GST NDC Dialogue – Mandated event, available at <https://unfccc.int/event/annual-gst-ndc-dialogue-mandated-event-0>.

### 3.10. Other topics under the UNFCCC

Several topics are closely linked to climate change, but they are not addressed in a specific article of the Paris Agreement. These topics are discussed at climate change conferences as agenda items under the UNFCCC. They include:

- the local communities and indigenous peoples' platform;
- gender and climate change;
- the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security; and
- research and systematic observation.

#### 3.10.1. Local communities and indigenous peoples

Many local communities and indigenous peoples are affected by the impacts of climate change. They can also contribute their knowledge on how to reduce these impacts. **The Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP)** was established in 2015 (decision 1/CP.21, UNFCCC 2015a). Since 2019, a Facilitative Working Group (FWG) has facilitated the implementation of the LCIPP relating to knowledge, capacity for engagement and climate change policies and actions. **Indigenous peoples are a particular focus of the Brazilian COP presidency.** The presidency, along with agencies such as the Brazilian Ministry of Indigenous Peoples, is facilitating the participation of indigenous peoples at COP30 (COP30 Brasil 2025a). Information on related events during the COP will be available at the LCIPP web portal<sup>25</sup>.

#### 3.10.2. Gender and climate change

In many respects, women are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change, particularly in developing countries. At the same time, they are often underrepresented when climate change-related decisions are made. To address these issues, the **Lima Work Programme on Gender** was established in 2014. It was extended by ten years at COP29 in 2024 (UNFCCC 2024d). At the SBI session held in Bonn in June 2025, activities for a new **Gender Action Plan (GAP)** were discussed, covering the following priority areas:

- capacity-building, knowledge management and communication;
- gender balance, participation and women's leadership;
- coherence (across international and national processes);
- gender-responsive implementation and means of implementation; and
- monitoring and reporting.

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<sup>25</sup> UNFCCC (2025l), Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform Web Portal, available at <https://lcipp.unfccc.int/>.

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At COP30, the SBI is tasked with finalising the list of activities for the GAP and forwarding it to the COP for adoption. While a comprehensive list of activities is available in an informal note (UNFCCC 2025j), there are diverging views among the Parties on the details of many of these activities, from the terminology used to timelines and funding.

### 3.10.3. Agriculture and food security

Changes in weather patterns affect agriculture across the globe, and agricultural soils and livestock are major sources of greenhouse gases. These close ties between climate change and agriculture are addressed in the '**Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security**'. At the session of the subsidiary bodies in Bonn in June 2025, a workshop was held on systemic and holistic approaches to climate action in agriculture, food systems and food security (UNFCCC 2025z). The results of this workshop will be considered by the SBI and SBSTA at the climate change conference in Belém. However, no specific workshop on agriculture and food security has been scheduled for this conference.

### 3.10.4. Research and systematic observation

Research and Earth observation are central to the understanding of climate processes and to mitigating and adapting to climate change. Under the agenda item '**Research and Systematic Observation**,' the SBSTA discusses recent findings of the IPCC, the WMO and other organisations, and draws conclusions on research needs. This item is regularly on the SBSTA agenda, including at COP30.

## 4. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK

The COP Presidency brought the conference to the Amazon this year to highlight the **importance of tropical rainforests** in the global climate system and the links between climate change and biodiversity loss. One of Brazil's initiatives in this area is the 'Tropical Forests Forever Fund' (TFFF), under which countries will receive payments for conserving areas of tropical and subtropical forests (COP30 Brasil 2025c).

However, the selection of Belém as the host city has also created challenges, such as the limited and high-priced accommodation options, which make participation difficult for representatives from many developing countries and many NGOs (Abnett 2025).

Since the rules for implementing the Paris Agreement were agreed at previous conferences, COP30 will focus on the status of implementation of the agreement, and on how to address existing gaps in the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions, the adaptation to climate change, and the provision of support to developing countries.

### 4.1. Mitigation: addressing the ambition gap

The recently submitted NDCs will be a key subject of discussions at the conference in Belém, although there is no formal agenda item that addresses them. NDCs are expected to be addressed in opening statements, in mandated and side events, and in negotiations relating to mitigation and support. Besides the NDCs of individual Parties, the **collective impact of all NDCs** will be of key importance.

The NDC synthesis report of the UNFCCC Secretariat<sup>26</sup>, which will be published in October 2025, will provide an estimate of global GHG emissions in 2035 resulting from the implementation of the new NDCs. As there is still a large gap between global emissions resulting from current NDCs up to 2030 and scenarios that would limit global warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C (UNFCCC 2024e), it can be expected that there will also be a large gap based on the new NDCs for 2035.

Hence, the NDC synthesis report will likely show that the mitigation ambition put forward by Parties in their NDCs is **not sufficient to meet the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement**. The main avenue of reducing this ambition gap will be the further update of NDCs, which is possible at any time. Important aspects to consider in NDCs will be whether the Parties have moved towards setting economy-wide targets for reducing GHG emissions, which are key to lowering global GHG emissions, and whether developing countries have included targets which are conditional on receiving support. Analysing the level of ambition of the individual NDCs and identifying possible ways of increasing this ambition in the years ahead is a task that goes beyond the scope of COP30. Civil society – encompassing environmental NGOs, researchers, businesses, and others – will play an important role in proposing solutions to reduce the ambition gap in current NDCs.

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<sup>26</sup> NDC synthesis reports are published on the NDC webpage: UNFCCC (2025n), Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), available at <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs>.

## 4.2. Adaptation: addressing the information gap

As the adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change varies from country to country, measuring collective progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation is challenging. Although a wide range of information on adaptation actions is available, this information is not easily comparable across countries. The **UAE-Belém work programme on the development of indicators**, which is expected to be concluded at COP30, will provide a set of indicators which will help to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation. Still, it will remain a challenge to collect and report information that is comparable across countries, and above all, to implement in a timely manner the adaptation actions needed to respond to a changing climate.

## 4.3. Support: addressing the finance gap

At COP30, some developing countries are expected to voice their continued disappointment with the **goal for public financial support** agreed under the NCQG in the previous year. This goal only covers a fraction of the overall climate-related finance needs of developing countries. The United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement makes it even more difficult to increase public financial support from developed countries. Nevertheless, it will be important for the remaining donor countries to increase their contributions with a view to meeting the NCQC. In addition, all countries need to explore new flows of climate finance, including private investment, and the redirection of subsidies towards climate-friendly activities. This would bring the Parties closer to the goal of the Paris Agreement of making finance flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Important input on how to address the gap in climate finance will come from the report of the COP29 and COP30 presidencies under the '**Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T**', which is scheduled to be published at the end of October 2025<sup>27</sup>, and which will be presented at a high-level event during the COP.

## 4.4. Outlook

When the Paris Agreement was adopted in 2015, it was seen as a positive example of multilateral collaboration. However, at a time of global economic and political uncertainties, and in light of the United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, **multilateralism** is being put to the test. It is crucial that COP30 maintains the resolve of all participating Parties to continue their commitment to the Paris Agreement and its implementation.

No major milestones are scheduled in the overall climate process during 2026. Towards the end of that year, Parties will submit their **second biennial transparency reports**, which are due in December. These reports will provide new information on the Parties' progress towards their NDC targets for 2030, and new data on GHG emissions, and on support provided to developing countries. These reports will serve as one of the inputs to the **second Global Stocktake**. The 'collection of inputs' phase of the second Global Stocktake is expected to begin towards the end of 2026, followed by the technical assessment phase in 2027. The process will conclude with the consideration of the outputs in 2028.

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<sup>27</sup> The roadmap is expected to be published on the 'Baku to Belém Roadmap' webpage: UNFCCC (2025d), Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T, available at <https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/baku-to-belem-roadmap-to-13t>.

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This study provides an overview of the status of international climate negotiations ahead of the climate change conference in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. It covers the key topics under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement.

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